价格和交货期敏感需求下基于鲁棒优化的双渠道供应链决策模型

Dual-channel Supply Chain Decision Model Based on Robust Optimizationunder Price and Delivery-time Dependent Demand

针对由一个制造商和在线、传统两个独立零售商组成的二级供应链,研究了价格和交货期敏感需求下的双渠道供应链决策问题。建立了以制造商为主方,两个零售商为从方的Stackelberg-Nash博弈模型。在仅知需求均值和方差信息条件下,给出了集中和分散决策下双渠道供应链最优定价、订货及提前期决策,设计了可使供应链完美协调的收益共享契约机制。最后,通过算例分析渠道偏好度、交货期敏感性和价格敏感性等对最优决策的影响,并给出相应的管理启示。研究表明:协调机制下供应链成员及系统利润均优于分散决策下的情况。在协调机制和分散决策下,渠道偏好度大的零售商更加占据市场优势,而消费者对交货期越敏感,在线零售商利润越低,传统零售商利润越高。在相同的决策结构下,不同渠道的价格敏感性对传统和在线零售商利润的影响情况正好相反。需求分布信息的缺失造成的损失比很小,说明基于文中方法得到的双渠道供应链决策能够有效抑制需求不确定性扰动,具有良好的鲁棒性。

With the popularization of Internet technology and e-commerce,online sales has developed rapidly and brought changes into all walks of life.In order to meet the needs of different types of consumers and improve profits,more and more enterprises have set up online direct sales channels and implemented both online and offline dual channel sales mode.However,the operation of dual channel retail mode is affected by many constraints.Under this background,it is of practical significance to study the competition and coordina⁃tion of dual channel supply chain.In practice,price and delivery time are two key factors that affect customers'choice of consumption channels.Delivery speed is of great importantance to cultivate the loyalty of online consumers.In terms of dual-channel supply chain decision-making,many researchers devoted themselves to the design of dual-channel supply chain coordination mechanism,but mainly assume that the product demand is known or follows a well-known distribution,which is unrealistic.Based on the above considerations,for a twostage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,an online retailer and a traditional retailer,the decision problem of the dual-channel supply chain under price and delivery time sensitive demand is studied.A Stackelberg-Nash game model with manufacturer as the leader and two retailers as the followers is established.With mean and variance of the demand as the only known information,the optimal pricing,ordering and lead time decisions of the dual-channel supply chain under the centralized and decentralized decision-making are presented,and the revenue sharing contract mechanism which can make supply chain perfectly coordinated is designed.Finally,numerical studies are performed to analyze the impacts of channel preference,delivery time sensitivity and price sensitivity on the optimal decision,and the corresponding management insights are summarized.The results show that the supply chain members and system profit under the coordination mechanism are better than those under the decentralized decision-making.Under the coordination mechanism and the decentralized decisionmaking,the retailer with a higher channel preference in the supply chain has the market advantage,while the more customers’sensitivity to the delivery time,the lower the profit of online retailer and the higher the profit of traditional retailer.Under the same decision-making structure,the price sensitivity of different channels has the opposite effect on the profits of traditional and online retailers.The lack of demand distribution information lead to a small loss ratio,indicating that the dual-channel supply chain decision obtained based on the proposed approach in this paper can effectively hedge against the disturbance of demand uncertainty and has a good robust⁃ness.The proposed models can provide effective decision supports for the research on dual-channel supply chain decision-making and coordination under price and delivery time sensitive demand,and the results offer a scientific guidance for enterprises on how to deal with the influence of uncertain factors。