摘要
针对中小企业的环境污染问题,供应链核心企业参与治理已成为一条重要路径。为分析政府作用于核心企业实现中小企业污染共治的策略选择,揭示环保刚性约束下中小企业污染问题对各主体的影响,本文构建政府、核心企业及中小企业的三方演化博弈模型,系统分析了奖惩机制下的策略演化过程。在此基础上,分析了限产力度、激励补贴效果、惩罚等参数对演化结果的影响。研究结果表明,政府倾向于采用激励补贴策略,核心企业在策略选择上对激励更为敏感,中小企业对惩罚更为敏感。限产对核心企业及中小企业的影响效果不同,较低的限产力度无法影响核心企业的策略选择,反而加重中小企业的负担。只有将供应链环保激励与限产策略协同推进,才能有效实现核心企业参与中小企业污染共治。
The impact of rigid environmental constraints on SMEs(Small and Medium-sized Enterprises)will further affect the development of core supply chain enterprises and society,which may lead to supply chain disruptions,such as“Schaeffler incident”.Involving the core enterprises of the supply chain in pollution treat⁃ment of SMEs has been an important way,to make enterprises in the supply chain pay more attention to the environmental issues of upstream and downstream enterprises.Based on the perspective of evolutionary game,with the core enterprises being the main members of the supply chain participated in the pollution management of SMEs,a three-party evolutionary game model containing government,core enterprises,and SMEs is constructed.According to the parameters such as production restriction coefficient and incentive effect coef⁃ficient,the impact of supply chain disruption caused by SMEs pollution on the government and core enterprises is analyzed,and corresponding co-governance strategies is proposed by solving the stable points of tripartite evolution under different situations.Results show that the government tends to subsidize SMEs through the sup⁃ply chain,and core enterprises are more sensitive to incentives and SMEs are more sensitive to penalties in terms of strategy choice.The effect of production restrictions on core enterprises and SMEs is different.Lower production restrictions cannot influence the strategy choice of core enterprises and will increase the burden of SMEs.Only if both the environmental incentives and production restriction strategies are conducted well,the strategy of core enterprises’involvement in the pollution treatment will work efficiently.
作者
包春兵
金宗凯
戎晓霞
孟庆春
于宇
BAO Chun-bing;JIN Zong-kai;RONG Xiao-xia;MENG Qing-chun;YU Yu(School of Management,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China;School of Mathematics,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China;Social Supernetwork Computation and Decision Simulation Laboratory,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第9期137-147,共11页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71974115)。
关键词
中小企业
污染共治
奖惩机制
绿色供应链
演化博弈
small and medium-sized enterprises(SEMs)
pollution co-governance
the mechanism of subsidy or punishment
green supply chain
evolutionary game