双向协同下产业共性技术跨组织合作研发微分博弈模型研究

Differential Game Model of the Cross-organizational Cooperative R&D of General Purpose Technologies under Two-way Collaboration

为解析共性技术跨组织合作研发模型选择及影响因素,在横纵双向协同下以高校和科研院所以及龙头企业为承担主体,运用微分博弈理论建立共性技术跨组织合作研发基准模型、产出依赖模型及努力依赖模型。研究发现:就双向协同系数而言,增加横向协同系数能提高三种模型下努力水平及研发总利润;纵向协同系数在边际收益系数较大时,对研发总利润产生先减后增的影响;双向协同系数均在努力依赖模型中最为敏感。就模型比较而言,产出依赖模型优于基准模型,固定监控成本作为调节变量,随其减小努力依赖模型将优于基准模型甚而优于产出依赖模型。就政府作用机制而言,政府应通过补贴和非补贴方式参与共性技术研发,产出依赖模型中政府须对双方给予补贴,努力依赖模型中政府须对高校和研究院所给予全额补贴。

Under the background of the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation,the innovation and breakthrough of General Purpose Technologies(GPTs),such as Artificial Intelligence,Big Data and Blockchain technology,have become an important opportunity for the country to occupy the commanding point in international competition.Due to GPTs R&D needs to deal with the dual uncertainties of technology and market,which makes the R&D motivation of a single enterprise insufficient,and requires organizations with different advantages to conduct cross-organizational cooperative R&D.The cross-organizational cooperative R&.D of GPTs including universities&.research institutes,leading enterprises and governments is studied.Following the idea of ensuring the effective development of supply and market-oriented development in the horizontal direction and the penetration of the two links in the vertical direction,the dynamic operation mechanism of GPTs cooperative R&.D is analyzed using the differential game theory.The results show that,in terms of influencing factors,the increase of horizontal collaboration coefficient is beneficial to stimulate the R&.D effort level of the universities&.research insti-tutes and leading enterprise and boost the R&D total benefit for the three models.The influence of vertical collaboration coefficient is more complex.The marginal revenue coefficient,which is larger,has a positive impact on the effort level of both sides and total R&.D benefit under the three models.In terms of model comparison,the output-dependent model outper forms the benchmark model,and as the fixed monitoring cost decreases,the effort dependent model outperforms the benchmark model and even the output-de-pendent model.As far as the role of government is concerned,government should participate in the R&D of GPTs through subsidies and non-subsidy methods.Government subsidies make the efforts level of the two subjects reach the level of the benchmark model.Government must subsidize both parties in the out-put-dependent model,and full subsidies must be given to the universities&.research institutes in the ef-fort-dependent model.Some management implications are revealed as follows.Firstly,the horizontal collaborative coefficient always plays a positive role,while the positive impact of the vertical collaborative coefficient can be re-leased when the marginal return coefficient reaches a certain threshold.Secondly,the monitoring cost has an important impact on the selection of cross-organizational cooperative R&.D models.Thirdly,govern-ment subsidies are conducive to enhancing the enthusiasm of participants in cross-organizational coopera-tive R&.D,and promoting the horizontal and vertical two-way collaboration.In addition,the government guides other social entities,such as financial institutions,to participate in the cross-or ganizational coop-erative R&D,which can ensure the horizontal collaboration in each of two links of GPTs cooperative R&.D.