摘要
在建设社会主义生态文明的背景下,本文基于微分博弈理论,构建了Nash非合作策略、集中式策略以及有成本分担契约的生态补偿策略,讨论中央政府参与补贴上下游治污投入以及上下游选择分担污染治理成本行为之间的互动博弈策略,得出以上策略中流域上下游各自相应的最优反馈策略和污染治理量随时间变化的最优轨迹并加以比较。得出以下结论:成本分担契约的引入不仅减少了中央政府承担生态补偿的财政压力,也有效促进了地区间的财政收入平衡,优化了流域间的资源分配,提高生态补偿的效率;上下游地方政府之间的成本分担使得上下游地方政府各自的治污投入水平、污染治理量、经济增加量达到三种策略里面的最高并与集中式策略相当,有效实现了流域生态补偿策略的协调;最后通过算例对相关参数进行分析,验证了结论的有效性,为上下游地方政府建立长期合作环境治理机制以及制定生态补偿政策提供了理论支撑。
The establishment of ecological compensation mechanism is an important institutional guarantee to promote the collaborative maintenance of ecological environment security between the upstream and downstream of the basin,and to realize the benefits and benefits of ecological environment protection economic benefit is an important way to win-win.Under the background of establishing socialist ecological civilization,based on differential game theory,Nash non-cooperative strategy is constructed,centralized strategy and ecological compensation strategy with cost sharing contract,and discusses the interactive game strategy between the central government's participation in subsidizing upstream and downstream pollution control investment and upstream and downstream choosing to share pollution control cost,The corresponding optimal feedback strategies of the upstream and downstream of the basin and the optimal trajectory of pollution control over time are obtained and compared,and a bargaining model is designed to distribute the environmental benefits of the basin.The following conclusions are drawn:①Downstream local governments and central governments should give priority to ensuring the long-term benefits of upstream local governments by establishing a perfect vertical transfer payment mechanism and formulating cost sharing contracts.②Only with the coordination of the central government and reasonable cost sharing between the upstream and downstream can the economic growth of the basin achieve Pareto improvement,and it is considered to improve the ecological compensation of the basin.The focus of the mechanism is to improve the financial transfer payment mechanism combining horizontal and vertical.By improving the central financial compensation mechanism,local governments are encouraged to control pollution and reduce emissions by means of tax adjustment,policy preference and special funds for ecological protection.③In the long run,due to the existence of the natural attenuation rate of pollution control,the joint efforts of governments at all levels,social organizations,people and other parties in the basin are more needed for the environmental problems of cross administrative regions.Finally,the relevant parameters are analyzed through an example to verify the effectiveness of the conclusion,which provides theoretical support for the upstream and downstream local governments to establish long-term cooperative environmental governance and formulate ecological compensation policies.
作者
程常高
周海炜
唐彦
马骏
石艳秋
CHENG Chang-gao;ZHOU Hai-wei;TANG Yan;MA Jun;SHI Yan-qiu(School of Business,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China;Jiangsu Province“World Water Valley”and Water Ecological Civilization Collaborative Innovation Center,Nanjing 211100,China;International River Research Institute,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China;School of Computer and Information,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第9期278-286,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目资助项目(71974053)
国家重点研发计划资助项目(2017YFC0405805-04)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(B230205046)。
关键词
央地协同
微分对策
生态补偿
最优控制方法
治污投入
central local collaboration
differential game
ecological compensation
optimal control method
pollution governance investment