生鲜电子商务供应链质量控制与保鲜努力决策研究

Quality Control and Preservation Effort Decision of Fresh Product E-commerce Supply Chains

为了研究生鲜电商供应链成员最优决策和利润状况,考虑1个生鲜供应商和1个生鲜零售商构成的二级供应链,其中供应商采取保鲜努力,零售商在此基础上采取质量控制,运用Stackelberg博弈理论,分别构建集中决策模型、分散决策模型和基准模型,分析供应链成员最优决策和利润的变化,分析保鲜努力需求弹性、保鲜努力成本系数等因素对最优决策的影响。结果表明:生鲜供应商和生鲜零售商的“搭便车”心理对保鲜努力水平和质量控制水平起到一定的抑制作用;集中决策、分散决策模型中保鲜努力和质量控制的差异分别随各自的成本效率的提升而增大;当质量控制成本效率和保鲜努力成本效率高于一定水平时,零售商会制定低于集中决策的零售价格来吸引消费者购买;制定的成本分担-补偿契约可提高供应商的保鲜努力水平并鼓励零售商进行质量控制,同时协调供应链。

To study the optimal decision and profit status of members of fresh product e-commerce supply chains,a secondary supply chain consisting of one fresh product supplier and one online fresh product retailer was considered,in which the supplier took preservation effort,and the retailer took quality control on this basis.Based on stackelberg game theory,the centralized decision model,decentralized decision model and benchmark model were constructed respectively to analyze the changes in the optimal decision and profit of the members of the supply chain,and the influence of factors such as demand elasticity of preservation effort and cost coefficient of preservation effort on the optimal decision was analyzed.The results show that the“free riding”mentality of the supplier and the retailer inhibit the level of preservation effort and quality control to some extent.The difference of preservation effort and quality control under centralized decision and decentralized decision increases with the increase of the cost efficiency.When the cost efficiency of quality control and preservation effort is higher than a certain level,the retailer will make retail prices lower than the centralized decision to attract consumers to buy.The cost-sharing and compensation contracts can improve the level of preservation effort of the supplier,encourage the retailer to exercise quality control and coordinate the supply chain.