企业生产可追溯食品的政府激励机制研究

Research on Government Incentive Mechanism for Enterprises to Produce Traceable Food

以可追溯猪肉为案例,构建以政府为委托人、企业为代理人的委托代理模型,比较实施食品可追溯体系前后政府与企业最优决策的变化,探讨政府应如何制定激励机制以促进企业生产可追溯食品;并通过数值分析方法分析在何种条件下企业实施猪肉可追溯体系的效果最佳,以及企业和政府的最优决策在不同参数环境下的变化。结果表明:政府应通过固定补贴的方式对企业实施可追溯体系的成本进行补助,并在企业逐步实施可追溯体系的过程中,适时增加对企业的绩效补贴力度。当企业努力成本较低和风险规避程度适中时,实施猪肉可追溯体系对降低代理成本和提高企业最优努力水平的效果最佳;当企业努力成本和风险规避程度适中时,实施猪肉可追溯体系对提高最优激励强度的影响最大。

Taking traceable pork as a case,a principal-agent model with the government as principal and the enterprises as agent is constructed.By comparing the changes in the optimal decisions of the government and the enterprises before and after the implementation of food traceability system,this paper studies how the government should develop incentive mechanism to promote the production of traceable food by enterprises.Numerical analysis methods are used to analyze under which conditions the implementation of pork traceability system will produce the best effect,and the changes of the optimal decision of enterprises and governments under different parameters.The results show that the government should subsidize the cost of implementing the traceability system through fixed subsidies,and in the process of gradually implementing the traceability system,the government should timely increase the intensity of performance subsidies to enterprises.Further numerical analysis results show that the implementation of pork traceability system has the best effect on reducing agency cost and improving the optimal effort level,when the enterprises’effort cost is low and the degree of risk aversion is moderate;the implementation of pork traceability system has the greatest effect on improving the optimal incentive intensity,when the enterprises’effort cost and the degree of risk aversion are moderate.