差异补贴策略下考虑风险规避的绿色供应链决策研究

Research on Green Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Risk Aversion under Differential Subsidy Strategy

考虑零售商风险规避特性,构建政府无补贴、制造商研发投资补贴、消费者购买补贴3种情形下的Stackelberg博弈模型,并以政府补贴总额一致为前提,比较两种补贴策略效果,最后通过算例分析进行补充说明。研究发现,零售商风险规避会提高产品绿色度,使得批发价格升高、制造商效用增大,而自身会因单位利润的降低导致效用减少;政府财政支出与零售商风险规避成正相关,补贴力度的加大对绿色供应链的运作起到积极作用,此时零售商存在“搭便车”行为;零售商风险规避不影响两种补贴策略优劣排序;政府以产品绿色度为目标会选择制造商研发投资补贴策略,制造商以效用最大化为目标会选择消费者购买补贴策略,零售商的选择受政府补贴系数影响。

Considering the risk-aversion characteristic of retailers,a Stackelberg game model is constructed under three conditions of no government subsidy,manufacturer's R&D investment subsidy,and consumer's purchase subsidy;the effects of the two subsidy strategies are compared on the premise that the total amount of government subsidies is consistent;finally,a supplementary explanation is given through numerical analysis.The research shows that retailer's risk aversion increases the greenness of products,leading to higher wholesale price and greater utility for manufacturer,while their own utility is reduced due to lower profits per unit.Government financial expenditure is positively correlated with retailer's risk aversion,and the increase in subsides plays a positive role in the operation of green supply chain,and then there is a“free riding”behavior of retailers.Risk aversion of retailers does not affect the ranking of the two subsidy strategies.Government chooses the manufacturer's R&D investment subsidy strategy for the greenness of products and the manufacturer chooses the consumer purchase subsidy strategy for utility maximization,but the retailer's choice is influenced by the government subsidy coefficient.