基于动态演化博弈的金融科技创新监管策略研究

Research on FinTech Innovation Supervision Strategy Based on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

通过构建包含金融科技公司和金融科技监管机构的双方动态演化模型,从演化博弈角度分析主体双方策略选择的演化稳定性,并用仿真分析研究主体双方创新监管策略选择的影响因素。研究结果表明:监管机构自身净收益与金融科技公司过度创新的额外收益,均决定了两个主体之间是否存在演化稳定策略。鉴于此,在对金融科技创新进行监管时,应该创新监管理念,采取适度监管的原则;创新监管手段,提升监管效率;加大惩罚力度,压缩过度创新的获利空间;不断健全金融市场规则,促进市场公平竞争。

By constructing a bipartite evolutionary game model between financial technology companies and regulatory authority,this paper analyzes the stability in the evolution of the strategic choices of both parties from the perspective of evolutionary game and uses simulation analysis to research the influential factors of innovative regulatory strategic choices of both parties.The results show that:both the net income of regulatory authority and the extra income of excessive innovation by financial technology companies determine whether there is evolutionary stability strategy between the two parties.In view of this,when regulating fintech innovation,innovate regulatory concepts and adopt the principle of moderate regulation;innovate regulatory methods and improve regulatory efficiency;increase punishment and compress the profit margin of excessive innovation;continuously improve financial market rules and promote fair competition in the market.