公众监督下绿色建筑开发利益主体行为的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Behavior of Green Building Development Stakeholders under Public Supervision

为解决我国绿色建筑开发仍存在的供给侧成本高、需求侧顾虑大等问题,探究了影响政府、建筑企业和公众对于绿色建筑市场发展过程中策略选择的关键因素,构建了政府、建筑企业和公众三方演化博弈模型。结果表明:为实现较为理想的(奖惩、开发绿色建筑、监督)策略组合,除需满足上级政府给予足额财政支持、在奖惩模式下开发绿色建筑的收益要高于传统建筑、政府补贴高于监督成本等三个基本条件外,通过调整监管监督成本、企业罚金、上级政府财政支持等因素组合,有助于提高系统向理想策略组合演化概率;并提出了相应的政策建议。

In order to solve the problems of highsupply-side costs and significant demand-side concerns in China's green building development,this paper explores the key factors influencing the strategic choices of the government,construction companies and the public during the development process of the green building market,and an evolutionary game model involving these three parties is established.The results show that to achieve an ideal combination of strategies(reward-punishment,green building development,supervision),three basic conditions must be met:ample fiscal support from the higher-level government,higher profits from developing green buildings under the reward-punishment model compared to traditional buildings,and government subsidies surpassing supervision costs,in addition,adjusting the combination of factors such as the regulatory supervision costs,the companies fines and the financial support from the higher-level government can improve the probability of the system evolving towards the ideal strategy combination.Based on these findings,it puts forward policy recommendations.