混合所有制改革进程中国有与非国有资本相互融合的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Mutual Fusion between State-owned Capital and Non-state-owned Capital in Mixed Ownership Reform

国有资本、集体资本、非公有资本等交叉持股、相互融合的混合所有制经济是我国基本经济制度的重要实现形式,积极推进混合所有制改革,促使国有与非国有资本融合发展意义重大。构建演化博弈模型分析了国有与非国有资本相互融合过程中策略选择的演化过程及其收敛趋势,并仿真模拟了政策激励影响博弈主体策略选择的动态演化过程。研究结果表明:国有与非国有资本相互融合的行为博弈存在演化稳定均衡策略,能否相互融合取决于事前交易成本、政策激励强度、政策倾斜与溢出以及新组建混合所有制企业预期收益。初始意愿高时,制度激励发挥了锦上添花效应,有效促进演化博弈系统收敛至理想状态,初始意愿低时具有减缓收敛速度的作用。事前经济激励具有正向引导效应,且初始意愿超过一定阈值后,将扭转博弈参与主体的最优策略选择,逐渐向“融合”转变。政策倾斜增加了国有资本的融合收益,但初始意愿偏低时,在模仿学习中仍倾向于“不融合”。政策溢出效应下降时,初始意愿超过一定阈值之后,理性的博弈参与者会转向“融合”策略。

The mixed ownership economy with cross shareholding and mutual integration of state-owned capital,collective capital and non-public capital is an important means to implement China’s basic economic system.It is of great significance to actively promote the reform of mixed ownership and foster the integrated development of state-owned and non-state-owned capital.This paper constructs an evolutionary game model,analyzes the evolution process and convergence trend of strategy selection in the process of mutual fusion between state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital,and simulates the dynamic evolution process of policy incentives affecting the strategy selection of game players.The results show that there is an evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy,and the result depends on the ex ante transaction cost,policy incentive intensity,policy inclination,policy spillover and the expected income of newly established mixed ownership enterprises.When the initial intention is high,institutional incentive plays an icing-on-the-cake role,effectively promoting the convergence of the evolutionary game system to the ideal state,and when the initial intention is low,it plays a role of slowing down the convergence speed.The ex ante economic incentive plays a positive guiding effect,and when the initial intention exceeds a certain level,it will reverse the optimal strategy choice of game participants and gradually change to“integration”.Although the policy inclination increases the income of state-owned capital choosing the“integration”strategy,when the initial intention is low,it still tends to choose“no integration”in the process of imitating the other party’s strategy.Without the policy spillover effect,the rational game participants will turn to the“integration”strategy when the initial intention exceeds a certain threshold.