协同行为视阈下默示算法共谋的挑战与优化

Challenges and Optimization of Tacit Collusion Towards Algorithm Collusion

算法的广泛商用在提升经济效率的同时也降低了经营者实施合谋的门槛,增加了合谋成功的风险和概率,因而逐渐成为反垄断法的关注重点。算法共谋可以使得合谋者通过信息技术的传递更为便捷地进行意思交流,甚至超越了垄断协议对于寡头垄断市场结构的限制,从而成为反垄断法规制、适用的一大挑战。无论是垄断协议还是共同市场支配地位都难以直接应用到算法共谋的场景。但算法默示共谋本质上不是“新型合谋”,并未超出现行反垄断法的约束框架。通过梳理司法实践可以发现,协同行为是应对形态复杂、行为隐蔽的算法默示共谋最有效率的制度选择。因此,秉持着“有效竞争与有为政府”的建设目标,优化协同行为制度成为规制算法默示共谋的首选,在现有分析框架中增加对技术要素的考量可以最大化发挥制度的效率优势以化解技术发展带来的社会“负效率”。

With the development of digitalization,the commercialization of algorithms has been widely popularized.While promoting economic efficiency,algorithms reduce the barriers for collusion,and increase the opportunities and risks of successful collusions,thereby turning into a major concern of antitrust enforcement.Algorithm collusion substantially facilitates the communications between colluding parties through information technologies,and thus is even not constrained by the oligopolistic market structure within traditional tacit collusion,thus raising genuine challenges to antitrust application and enforcement.Neither traditional tacit collusion nor joint market power can directly apply to the scenarios raised by algorithm collusion.However,algorithmic collusion does not constitute a“new type of collusion”,and it is still subject to the current anti-monopoly law.The existing theory and international practice demonstrate that an optimized tacit collusion offers a better option to regulate algorithm collusion that is comprised of different degree of choices and hidden behavior.Consequently,it is proposed to set the optimization of tacit collusion at the forefront of the regulation of algorithm collusion for the purpose of complying with the ultimate goal of building effective competition and good governance.The key remains at positioning the evaluation of technological factors within the current antitrust analytical framework,which may maximize the institutional efficiency merits and mitigate the“negative efficiency”brought about by technological development.