20世纪70年代初美国对苏联军力进入印度洋的战略评估与有限应对

The Assessment and Reaction of the U.S.Government toward the Soviet Naval Existence in the Indian Ocean in the beginning of 1970s

从1968年起,苏联海军舰艇开始频繁进出印度洋,并保持在印度洋的长期军事存在。如何判断苏联军力进入印度洋乃至苏联海上力量整体崛起的性质、意图、能力和威胁,成为西方舆论及部分决策层人士高度关注的话题。在此情况下,美国国家安全委员会、参谋长联席会议、国务院、中央情报局等相关职能部门经过多轮系统研究,对上述问题做出了理性、冷静的评估,认定美苏印度洋竞争所涉及利益和威胁都相对温和。加之国会舆论及资源压力,美国决策层最终确定了在印度洋保持与苏联低水平军事竞赛、以争夺政治影响力为重点的应对策略。70年代美国印度洋战略处处体现出“适度”原则,其本质是有限利益下的有限应对,其中经验亦可为当前中国探索“海洋强国”之路提供参考借鉴。

Since 1968,the Soviet naval units started to enter and pass the Indian Ocean frequently and established long-term military existence there,which caused serious concern among western nations.Under the circumstances,the U.S.National Security Council,J.C.S.,State Department C.I.A.and other government agencies made several rounds of assessment on the Soviet threat,capability,intention as well as the U.S.interest in the Indian Ocean area,and decided to react by focusing on the political rivalry but keeping the military competition on relatively low level.The U.S.Indian Ocean strategy was modest response for modest interest.