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基于随机演化博弈的医疗数据共享协调机制研究 被引量:5

The Coordination Mechanism of Medical Data Sharing Based on Stochastic Evolutionary Game
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摘要 【目的/意义】面对当前医疗数据共享存在的基本原则要素缺乏、动力不足以及隐私安全风险难以保障等问题,构建医疗数据共享的协调机制,以提升健康医疗数据的开放治理水平。【方法/过程】本文考虑外部环境的不确定性,基于医疗机构、技术支撑企业和政府参与的医疗数据共享策略选择,构建主体成本分摊和利益分配的随机演化博弈模型,并通过数据仿真对博弈主体的策略演化进行分析。【结果/结论】研究结果表明:技术支撑企业是促进医疗数据共享的关键主体,其策略选择易受到初始概率、建设费用承担比例、隐私安全问题承担比例、收益分享比例及随机扰动等因素的影响;医疗机构、政府共同参与导致的额外成本效应增加会提高双方参与合作的积极性;技术支撑企业是否参与医疗数据共享建设的费用承担对医疗机构策略选择会产生差异性的影响;效益差距及隐私安全问题的承担比例会影响到医疗机构的策略方向选择。【创新/局限】本文的创新性在于将演化博弈与随机过程相结合,为不确定性环境下医疗机构、技术支撑企业和政府共享协调机制的研究提供新的解决思路,但未考虑其他医疗数据主体和更全面的影响因素,以及尚未找到多数据的处理方式,后续可对此进行进一步探讨。 【Purpose/significance】To improve the open governance of medical data,a coordinating framework for medical data sharing is created in response to the current issues of a lack of fundamental principles,a lack of desire,and difficulty in safeguarding privacy and security hazards.【Method/process】This study takes the unpredictability of the external environment into account,constructs a stochastic evolutionary game model based on the strategy choice and the distribution of rights,responsibilities and benefits of medical data sharing involving hospitals,technology support enterprises and the government,and analyzes the strategy evolution of game subjects through data simulation.【Result/conclusion】The study's findings indicate that:technical support enterprises are key players in promoting medical data sharing,and their decision regarding a strategy is susceptible to initial probabilities,the proportion of construction costs to be borne,the proportion of privacy and security issues to be borne,the proportion of benefit sharing and stochastic perturbations;the increase of additional cost effect caused by the hospital-government cooperation in construction will increase the enthusiasm of both parties to participate in cooperation;Hospitals'choice of strategy will differ depending on whether technical support enterprises participate in medical data sharing construction of cost bearing;the benefits gap and the proportion of privacy and security issues bearing will also influence hospitals'strategy choice.【Innovation/limitation】The innovation of this paper lies in the combination of evolutionary game and stochastic process,which provides a new solution for the research of sharing and coordination mechanism among medical institutions,technology support enterprises and government in an uncertain environment,but other medical data subjects and more comprehensive influencing factors are not considered,as well as the handling of multiple data is not yet found,which can be further explored subsequently.
作者 苏强 季荔 SU Qiang;JI Li(School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)
出处 《情报科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2023年第9期37-47,共11页 Information Science
基金 国家自然科学基金“‘互联网+’环境下的医患矛盾产生机理与演化规律研究”(71972146)。
关键词 医疗数据共享 演化博弈 随机过程 成本分摊和利益分配 仿真分析 medical data sharing evolutionary game stochastic processes cost sharing and benefit allocation simulation analysis
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