基础研究资助逆向激励的考察

Perverse Incentives in Academic Research Funding

本文通过匹配国家自然科学基金面上项目资助与成果信息,构建了衡量学术研究逆向激励的指标。自1992年,样本中兼项人员占比从接近0增长至8%,挂名人员占比从60%下降至40%;自2007年,高质量论文占比从25%快速提升至近70%,专利授权率和转化率分别始终保持在90%和14%左右。利用2011年基金委面上项目资助结构改革,使用连续型双重差分模型,发现改革总体呈现正面效应。增加经费投入产生了减少兼项的正向激励,对挂名无显著影响,提升了论文数、专利数和高质量论文占比,但降低了专利授权率。影响机制分析表明,兼项和挂名会削弱经费投入的积极作用。异质性分析表明,竞争博弈是导致逆向激励的主要原因之一,增加经费投入在激烈竞争的依托单位、学科和人员类型上呈现更强的逆向激励作用。本文对合理激励科研人才、深化改革科技体制、优化配置创新资源有重要的借鉴意义。

Basic research is the source of scientific and technological innovation.China’s funding for basic research is growing rapidly,a large part of which is for academic scientists.The extent to which the increasing funding can motivate academic scientists to devote themselves to research and promote the development of basic research has been a topic of concern at present.The literature suggests that it is necessary to pay attention to incentives that influence academic scientists.The increasing academic misconduct risks have led to discussions on perverse incentives.Perverse incentives refer to the deviation of the actual effect from the intended effect after quantitative performance metrics are set.Once incentives for academic scientists become perverse,the intended goals,such as increasing research outputs or expanding institutions’influence,will be misleading and even counterproductive.However,there is virtually no research exploring the impact of perverse incentives on scientific productivity using large micro data.Based on a matched database containing the funding of the National Natural Science Foundation of China’s(NSFC)general program,publication,and patent information,this study constructs indicators to measure the perverse incentives of academic researchers in China.Since 1992,the proportion of scientists involved in more than three projects simultaneously has increased from about 0 to 8%,while the proportion of unproductive scientists has decreased from 60%to 40%.Since 2007,the proportion of highquality papers has increased rapidly from 25%to nearly 70%,while the grant and assignment rate of patents have remained at approximately 90%and 14%.Based on the funding structure reform of the general program in 2011,this study uses the differencein-difference model to test the impact of the reform on academic researchers.We find that positive funding shock has a benign effect but increases the risk of perverse incentives.It helps to bring the proportion of scientists involved in more than three projects down and has no significant effect on the proportion of unproductive scientists in projects.The reform also increases the number of publications and patents.In terms of the quality of outputs,it increases the proportion of high-quality papers and journal impact factor(JIF)but reduces the patent grant rate.The mechanism analyses reveal that perverse incentives weaken the positive effect of the reform.The heterogeneity results reveal that hypercompetition is one of the main reasons leading to perverse incentives.The increase in funding has stronger negative effects on the more competitive institutes,disciplines,and groups of scientists.On the contrary,it has more positive incentive effects on non-top institutes,disciplines with higher funding rates,and young researchers.This study has important reference significance for motivating scientific researchers,deepening the reform of science and technology systems,and optimizing the allocation of innovation resources.We suggest that(a)basic research is long-cycling and high-risk,which makes it difficult for the market to lead efficient resource investment in scientific research activities.Therefore,the government should further exert the functional role of financial investment and continue to increase and optimize investment in basic research.(b)To improve the allocative efficiency of innovation resources,it is recommended to develop management measures to disclose important information about scientists’research projects from public and business sources,such as the names,funding periods,funding amounts,and team members of the projects.(c)The institutions should pay more attention to patent transfer and application and give larger weight to patent quality and transfer in the performance evaluation of academic scientists.(d)Properly distributed funding plays a key role in encouraging academic scientists to concentrate on their work.The government should improve the classified management of research projects according to the characteristics of different groups and optimize the support proportion of stable and competitive funds.