基于微分博弈的沙漠化治理模式

Desertification control mode based on differential game theory

在只依赖政府投资治理土地沙漠化不具有可持续性背景下,研究政府以什么模式引入社会资本治理土地沙漠化是具有现实意义的问题.通过构建微分博弈模型,研究了政企双方在非合作和合作不同模式下的最优治理投入水平、治理规模的最优轨迹以及收益变化.研究表明,在非合作模式下,企业独立承担其治理成本的治理规模与政企收益均最低,但政府可以降低税率促进企业提高治理投入水平,并且政府分担企业的部分治理成本能够提高治理规模和双方收益,同时适当提高税率能够促进政企双方的治理投入水平.政企合作是最优治理模式,在合作模式下政府的税率调控将会影响双方的最优收益分配比例.研究结果能够为政府采取不同模式引入社会资本治理沙漠化提供决策参考,并且为政府调控政策提供理论支撑.

When it is not sustainable to rely only on government investment to control desertification,it is of practical significance to study the mode in which the government can introduce social capital to control desertification.Differential game models are established to study the optimal governance input level,the optimal trajectory of governance scale,and the revenues of the government and enterprises under the non-cooperative and cooperative modes respectively.The results show that in the non-cooperative mode,the governance scale and both parties’revenues are the lowest when the firm bears the governance costs solely.However,the government can reduce tax rate to incentivize the enterprise to improve its governance input level.In addition,the government can improve the governance scale and both parties’revenues by sharing part of the governance costs,and appropriately increasing tax rate can promote the governance input level of both parties.Cooperation between the government and the enterprise is the optimal governance mode,in which the government’s tax rate regulation will affect the optimal revenue distribution ratio of both parties.The results can provide reference for the government to adopt different modes to introduce social capital to control desertification,and provide theoretical support for the government’s regulatory policies.