不同信息模式下流量赞助服务对电信服务供应链的影响研究

The impact of data sponsorship service on telecom service supply chain under different information modes

流量赞助服务允许内容提供商为用户消费其内容产生的流量提供赞助。流量赞助服务对电信服务供应链的影响机制,是电信服务领域的重要问题之一。本文考虑电信服务两级供应链,构建以互联网服务提供商为领导者、内容提供商为追随者的Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨流量赞助服务对供应链参与者及其社会福利的影响。研究表明,流量赞助服务有利于供应链的绩效。首先在完全信息情境下,互联网服务提供商的先发优势使其获得超额收益,流量赞助服务降低内容提供商的收益。其次探讨了内容提供商的运营成本为其私有信息的情形,此时上述先发优势被削弱,内容提供商也可能从流量赞助服务获益,互联网服务提供商的收益则可能受损;此外,博弈可能形成两种极端均衡结果:(1)若内容提供商收取的订阅费较高而单位成本较低,流量赞助服务产生帕累托改进;(2)若单位成本较高,流量赞助服务导致序贯囚徒困境。最后比较分析两种信息模式下的影响机制,并为政府进行市场规制提出策略建议。

Data sponsorship service refers to an innovative business model in which the Internet service providers(ISPs)allow content providers(CPs)to subsidize their users′data consumption such that their contents do not count toward their users′data caps.However,the data sponsorship service has provoked considerable controversies on whether the service violates the net neutrality rules.The social consensus on the legality of the service has not been reached.Thus,government regulators and industry participants must urgently understand the impact of data sponsorship services on the telecom service market.A few studies paid attention to this issue.However,few have systematically explored the effect of data sponsorship services on all three parties in the market,i.e.,ISP,CP and users,and social welfare.Moreover,this effect is closely related to the information context between ISP and CP.Therefore,how data sponsorship service affects the benefits(utility)of relevant parties and social welfare in the telecom service market must be studied under two information modes(i.e.,complete and incomplete information).Our work focuses on a two-level telecom service supply chain,including ISP and CP as suppliers.We construct a Stackelberg game model with ISP as the leader and CP as the follower.We aim to investigate macroscopically the impact of data sponsorship services on the interaction between the ISP and the CP,the profits(utility)of supply chain participants,and the overall social welfare by considering two information modes,i.e.,complete and incomplete information.We separately explore the decision of ISP and CP with and without launching the data sponsorship service under each information mode.In the sequential game,the ISP first decides the access price of Internet service,whereafter the CP decides the subsidization proportion for users′data consumption.Moreover,we assume that ISP only understands CP′s marginal cost distribution under the incomplete information mode.In equilibrium,the sponsorship of CP generally increases with the subscription fee charged by CP and decreases with CP′s marginal cost.CP chooses not to offer any data sponsorship under complete or incomplete information mode when the subscription fee is below a certain threshold.Moreover,data sponsorship service may not necessarily be beneficial in improving the benefits(utility)of the participants in the telecom service supply chain and social welfare.Nonetheless,the equilibrium analysis presents different impact mechanisms under complete and incomplete information modes,which may inspire new insights.In the complete information mode,the telecom service supply chain is not affected after the ISP launches the data sponsorship service when the subscription fee charged by CP is below a certain threshold.CP chooses to increase sponsorship as the subscription fee increases.The data sponsorship service increases ISP′s profit while decreasing CP′s profit.The impact on user utility and social welfare depends on specific market parameters:data sponsorship service improves user utility and social welfare when the CP′s subscription fee exceeds a certain threshold.However,the opposite is true when the CP′s subscription fee is below the threshold.This result can be attributed to the first-mover advantage of ISP,which may render ISP reap the incremental profit generated from the high data consumption from large user size and even additional profit from the CP.Thus,CP contrarily suffers profit reduction from data sponsorship services.In the incomplete information mode,CP chooses not to sponsor the data consumption when the subscription fee is low.Thus,no impact is imposed on the telecom service supply chain.As subscription fees increase,CP tends to increase the traffic sponsorship.If the marginal cost of CP is high relative to the subscription fee,the data sponsorship service reduces the profit of ISP and CP,user utility,and social welfare.Thus,the supply chain falls into a sequential prisoner′s dilemma.Conversely,data sponsorship leads to Pareto improvement of the supply chain when the marginal cost is relatively low compared with the subscription fee.All the parties enjoy merit from data sponsorship.The marginal cost of CP can weaken the first-mover advantage of ISP to some extent and improve the fairness of revenue distribution in the telecom service market.In summary,our study implies that the impact of data sponsorship service is sensitive to market status,which can be positive,negative,or even has no influence under different levels of CP′s subscription fee and marginal costs.Therefore,a“one-size-fits-all”ban on data sponsorship services may not be a wise choice for market regulators(government).In general,traffic sponsorship service tends to benefit from the performance of the telecom service supply chain with CP′s private operation information and low level of CP′s operation cost.The conclusions provide enlightenment and strategic suggestions for the government′s supervision and regulation of the telecom service market.