信息不对称下高科技企业产能预定合同研究

Research on Production Capacity Predetermined Contract of High-tech Enterprises under Information Asymmetry

考虑到信息不对称的常态化现象,有信息优势的制造商为获私利,会选择隐瞒甚至夸大对市场需求的预测,而供应商往往采取比较保守的产能投资决策,由此越发造成高科技产业中产能不足、高缺货率的现象。据此,本文针对高科技企业中的产能预定合同进行研究,并分析制造商需求信息的精确度、需求的可变性对产能协调的影响,进一步论证了产能预定合同对高科技企业合作协调产能具有明显作用。

Taking into account the normal phenomenon of information asymmetry,manufacturers with information advantages will choose to conceal or even exaggerate the forecast of market demand in order to gain private interests,while suppliers often take more conservative production capacity investment decisions,which increasingly causes the phenomenon of insufficient production capacity and high stock shortage rate in high-tech industries.Based on this,this paper studies the production capacity predetermined contract in high-tech enterprises,analyzes the impact of the accuracy of manufacturers'demand information and the variability of demand on production capacity coordination,and further demonstrates that production capacity predetermined contract plays an obvious role in the cooperation and production capacity coordination of high-tech enterprises.