非处罚性监管能否抑制大股东掏空风险?——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的研究

Can Non-punitive Regulation Suppress the Risk of Major Shareholder Tunneling:Research Based on Annual Report Inquiry Letters from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges

基于沪深交易所问询函监管的重要政策,以2015—2020年间沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证考察了年报问询函对大股东掏空的监管作用及其影响机制。结果表明,在我国制度背景下,年报问询函监管能够有效治理大股东掏空,且能够同时抑制关联交易和资金占用两类掏空行为的发生。经过一系列的稳健性检验,上述结果未发生任何实质性改变。进一步的机制检验表明,年报问询函监管能够削弱掏空动机、加强掏空约束,弥补公司内外部治理不足,从而抑制大股东掏空行为。具体地,在股权集中度低、两权分离度大,以及股权制衡度低、市场关注度低的公司中,年报问询函对大股东掏空行为的抑制作用更为明显。

Based on the important policies for inquiry letter supervision in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 as research samples,this study empirically investigates the regulatory role of annual report inquiry letter on major shareholder tunneling and its impact mechanism.The results indicate that in the context of China current system,annual report inquiry letter regulation can effectively govern major shareholder tunneling and simultaneously suppress the occurrence of such tunneling behavior as connected transaction and fund occupation.The above results have not undergone any substantial changes after a series of robustness tests.And further mechanism testing indicates that annual report inquiry letter regulation can weaken tunneling motive,strengthen tunneling constraint,compensate for company’s internal and external governance deficiency,and thus suppress the tunneling behavior of major shareholders.Specifically,the suppressing effect of annual report inquiry letter on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders is more significant in companies with low equity concentration,high separation of ownership and control as well as companies with low equity balance and low market attention.