控股股东侵占疑虑会造成融资约束吗?

Does Expropriation Concerns of Controlling Shareholders Cause Financing Constraint?

本文从不完全契约理论与控股股东剩余控制权关系出发,在第二类代理问题中衍生出“投资方—融资方”这一新的代理问题。利用中国上市公司2012—2022年面板数据,在新的代理问题框架下,实证研究控股股东侵占疑虑是否会造成融资约束。研究发现:无论从质的维度还是从量的维度,中国上市公司显著存在控股股东侵占疑虑造成的融资约束问题。投资方对控股股东侵占疑虑越重,融资约束程度越高,这也说明了以控股股东为主导的融资方由于剩余索取权的利益侵占倾向,加重了投资方的反向抑制。该结论在稳健性检验后依然成立。在此基础上,本文从提高公司治理机制的角度,为缓解控股股东侵占疑虑造成的融资约束问题提供了方向性建议。本文的研究扩展了原有两类代理问题的研究视域,这不仅丰富和补充了控股股东利益侵占与融资约束关系的相关理论研究,也为控股股东利用有效公司治理机制,提高公司融资效率提供了方向性选择。

In the field of corporate governance,domestic and foreign researchers have studied the issue of benefit expropriation,mainly focusing on two types of agency problems.At present,the academic research on the second type of agency problem mainly focuses on the rationality of the static,and they are carried out in the framework of“shareholder supremacy,”which is related to the situation of the occurrence of this problem at the end of the 20th century.However,with the stakeholder theory proposed,it is found that some ideas of“shareholder supremacy”are flawed,and it is necessary to study the behavior and economic consequences of controlling shareholders’benefit expropriation from the perspective of the reality of the dynamic game of relational subjects.Based on the relationship between incomplete contract theory and the controlling shareholders’residual control rights,this paper derives a new agency problem of“investor‐financier”from the second type of agency problem.This paper empirically studies whether the expropriation concerns of controlling shareholders will cause financial constraints.The findings indicate that Chinese listed companies exhibit financial constraints caused by the expropriation concerns of controlling shareholders qualitatively and quantitatively.This conclusion remains valid after robustness tests.Further analysis shows that firm ownership type and CEO Duality have a heterogeneous impact on financing constraints.Based on the above analysis,it is confirmed that the greater the investors’doubts about the benefit expropriation of controlling shareholders,the greater the degree of financial constraints.This indicates that the financing party dominated by the controlling shareholder has increased the reverse inhibition of the investors due to the benefit expropriation tendency of the residual claim.Compared with previous literature,this paper has contributions in the following two aspects.First,it is clear that the agency problem of“investor‐financier”does exist.Investors with inferior information will have concerns due to the benefit expropriation of controlling shareholders.Consequently,they will reduce the confidence and willingness of capital supply,or increase the price of capital supply,which will increase financial constraints.Second,based on the financial constraint effect of controlling shareholders’expropriation concerns,this paper discusses the governance effect on the agency problem of“investor‐financier”from aspects of information transparency,the degree of regulatory violation and the degree of equity checks and balances.This study extends the scope of the original two types of agency problems,not only enriching theoretical research on the relationship between controlling shareholders’benefit expropriation and financing constraints,but also providing reference for controlling shareholders to employ effective corporate governance mechanisms to improve corporate financing efficiency.