机构投资者实地调研、审计师选择与审计延迟

Institutional InvestorsSite Visit,Auditor Selection With Audit Report Lag

机构投资者实地调研是了解上市公司财务经营状况的重要手段,对提升资本市场信息披露效率起重要作用。本文以2013—2020年深圳证券交易所A股上市公司为研究对象,运用双向固定效应模型实证检验机构投资者实地调研对审计延迟的影响及其作用机制。研究结果显示,机构投资者实地调研有效抑制了审计延迟,其他条件不变时,受到机构投资者实地调研将导致上市公司审计延迟平均降低2.1%。本文还采用多种方法开展了稳健性检验,所得研究结论依然成立。机制分析发现,审计师选择是机构投资者实地调研降低审计延迟的调节机制。此外,本文还进一步研究了机构投资者类型的异质性影响以及机构投资者调研广度和调研深度对审计延迟的影响。总体而言,本研究丰富了机构投资者实地调研与审计延迟领域的研究,为监管部门进一步提升资本市场信息披露效率提供了理论参考。

In recent years,due to the development of capital market and the increasing complexity of commercial activities,it is difficult for enterprises to depend solely on internal governance to improve governance quality in a fast changing environment.Therefore,institutional investors,as the strongly motivated external governance force,are gradually raising the attentions of both the academia and regulatory department.Existing literature mainly focuses on institutional investorsgovernance role in supervising corporate decisions and improving information environment,but little literature has investigated how institutional investors improve information disclosure efficiency by releasing their governance effect and reduce auditing report lags through site visits.Taking the sample of Chinese Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed enterprises for 2013 to 2020,this study empirically examines the association between institutional investorscorporate site visits(SVs)and audit report lags.The results indicate that SVs significantly reduce audit report lags,as listed enterprises with SVs exhibit an averagely 2.1%reduction of audit report lags,ceteris paribus.This result holds after we address endogeneity concerns with 2SLS regression and remains Taking enterprises listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange for 2013 to 2020 as the samples,this study empirically examines the association between institutional investorssite visits and audit report lags.The results indicate that site visits significantly reduce audit report lags,as listed enterprises with site visits exhibit an averagely 2.1%reduction of audit report lags,ceteris paribus.The result holds after addressing endogeneity concerns with 2SLS regression,and remains robust under various robustness tests.Further investigations indicate that site visits form a moderating mechanism with auditor selection,as site visits facilitate enterprisesauditor characteristics to build collaborative external-governance effects on enterprisesfinancial information disclosure,improving the auditing efficiency of enterprises which select auditors with higher reputation,better industrial expertise with more auditing experience,enhancing the negative impact of site visits on audit report lags.our empirical analysis shows the impact of site visits by different types of institutional investors on audit report lags,and reveals the effect of site visitswidth and depth on audit report lags.The results indicate that site visits by different types of institutional investors all inhibit audit report lags,and reduces audit report lags.In sum,this study empirically verifies the governance effect of site visits on audit report lags,supporting the academic theory which indicates institutional investorsmonitoring roles.It extends the research scope of site visits and contributes to empirical literature focusing on audit efficiency in a Chinese context and provides several policy implications.