政府干预突发事件信息共享的动态奖惩机制研究

Research on Dynamic Reward and Punishment Mechanism of Government Intervention in Emergency Information Sharing

研究政府干预多方主体参与突发事件信息共享的动态奖惩机制,并探寻不同奖惩机制下主体选择的差异性.以静态奖惩机制下的博弈模型为依托,构建由政府、企业、社会组织共同参与的动态奖惩机制下的博弈模型,并以Jacobian矩阵为技术支持,分析动态奖惩机制下各主体参与突发事件信息共享决策的演化过程与差异性.结果显示:政府面向企业的突发事件信息共享的监管,应设立动态惩罚奖励机制;以动态奖励机制为前提,对社会组织实施监管效果明显;企业与社会组织积极性处于较低水平时,政府设立动态惩罚与奖励机制意愿呈向上倾斜趋势.

This paper attempts to build a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism for government intervention in multi-party subjects to participate in the information sharing of emergencies,and explore the differences of subject selection under different reward and punishment mechanisms.This study divides the participants in emergency information sharing into enterprises,social organizations and governments,builds a game model under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism based on the game model under the static reward and punishment mechanism,and takes the Jacobian matrix as the technical support,focusing on the analysis of the evolution process and differences of the participants in emergency information sharing decision-making under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism.The results show that the government should establish a dynamic punishment and reward mechanism for the supervision of enterprise oriented emergency information sharing;Taking the dynamic reward mechanism as the premise,the effect of supervision on social organizations is obvious;When the enthusiasm of enterprises and social organizations is at a low level,the willingness of the government to set up a dynamic punishment and reward mechanism is inclined upward.