政府参与下城市更新基金运作管理的博弈研究

A Game Study on the Operation and Management of Urban Regeneration Fund with Government Participation

城市更新基金作为一种创新融资模式充分发挥了政府资金的引导作用,拓展了城市更新项目资金筹措的途径。为协调城市更新基金中政府和基金管理人的利益诉求并提高基金运作效率,基于城市更新基金运作管理中的利益冲突,针对政府与基金管理人的运作管理模式进行演化博弈分析,构建城市更新基金运作管理的策略选择动态行为模型,探究促使基金管理人积极运营的关键要素与条件。结果发现,政府通过收益分配优化、监管惩罚及利益捆绑等手段可实现对基金管理人的策略引导,进而提出明确政府引导边界、建立立体化绩效评价体系及健全基金激励机制等政府参与下的城市更新基金运作管理建议,为提高城市更新基金运作效率及可持续性提供借鉴。

As an innovative financial model,the urban regeneration fund harnesses the government's fiscal guidance while broadening the spectrum of capital acquisition ways for urban regeneration.To coordinate the interest demands among the government and fund managers within the urban regeneration fund and enhance the fund's operational eficiency,based on the interest conflicts in the operation and management of the urban regeneration fund,an evolutionary game analysis is conducted to examine the operation and management modes of the government and fund managers,and a dynamic behavioral model for strategy selection in the operation and management of urban regeneration fund is established to investigate the critical elements and circumstances that encourage proactive engagement by fund managers.The results show that the government can guide the fund managers through optimizing the distribution of income,regulatory punishment and bundling of interests.Suggestions for clarifying the boundaries of the government's guidance,establishing a comprehensive performance evaluation framework and enhancing the fund's incentive mechanism are provided to improve the operational efficiency and sustainability of the urban regeneration fund.