碳税和风险规避下闭环供应链减排及协调研究

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Emission Reduction and Coordination Under Carbon Tax Policy and Risk Aversion

为研究制造商风险规避行为对供应链运作及减排的影响,建立了一个两阶段模型.首先,构建由制造商与零售商组成的集中和分散决策博弈模型,求解并分析碳税税率以及制造商风险规避程度对均衡解的影响.进而,基于合作博弈理论,提出了一种修正Shapley值利润分配机制,通过合理分配利润来激励供应链成员协作共担风险.结果表明:在较低范围内提高碳税税率,可以促进集中决策下的减排水平和减排量,但分散决策不一定.集中决策具有明显的经济和减排双重优势,但制造商风险规避行为会削弱这种优势,并可能导致集中决策利润低于分散决策.受制造商风险规避影响,供应链利润分配存在严重的“背离”现象.所提的修正Shapley值在制造商低风险规避时可实现供应链协调,并且在利润分配的公平性上优于经典Shapley值.

To study the impact of manufacturer risk aversion behavior on supply chain operation and emission reduction,a two-stage model is established.First,centralized and decentralized decision game models composed of a risk aversion manufacturer and a retailer are constructed,and the effects of carbon tax rate and manufacturer risk aversion degree on equilibrium solutions are solved and analyzed.Then,based on cooperative game theory,a revised Shapley value profit allocation mechanism is proposed to motivate supply chain members to cooperate and share risks by reasonably allocating profits.The results show that:Increasing the carbon tax rate in a lower range can promote the emission reduction level and emission reduction amount under centralized decision,but not necessarily under decentralized decision.Centralized decision has obvious economic and emission reduction advantages,but manufacturer risk aversion behavior will weaken this advantage and may lead to lower profits of centralized decision than decentralized decision.Affected by manufacturer risk aversion,there is a serious"divergence"phenomenon in supply chain profit allocation.The proposed revised Shapley value enables supply chain coordination when the manufacturer is low-risk averse and outperforms the classical Shapley value in terms of fairness of profit distribution.