碳交易规制下过度自信制造商与减排服务商的减排博弈研究

Research on Emission Reduction Game between an Overconfident Manufacturer and an Emission Reduction Service Supplier under the Cap-and-trade Regulation

考虑碳交易规制的约束,构建过度自信制造商和减排服务商的供应链决策模型,研究在定制和订购两种减排外包模式下,制造商与减排服务商之间的博弈均衡,探讨过度自信及相关参数对于制造商和减排服务商的决策和期望利润的影响。研究表明:两种减排模式下制造商和减排服务商均存在最优决策。定制和订购模式下,制造商与减排服务商的产量、单位产品减排量及利润随着初始碳排放量与制造商的减排系数增加而降低。除减排服务价格以外,产量、单位产品减排量及利润与减排服务商的减排系数呈反方向变动。在一定条件下,两种模式下供应链成员企业的最优决策、期望利润和实际利润大致也随着过度自信水平的升高而下降。当需求函数满足均匀分布时,订购模式对减排服务商更有利,定制模式对制造商更有利。

Considering the constraints of cap-and-trade regulation,a supply chain decision-making model of overconfident manufacturers and emission reduction service suppliers is constructed,and the game equilibrium between manufacturers and emission reduction service suppliers under the two outsourcing modes of customiza⁃tion and ordering is studied.It also discussed the impact of overconfidence and related parameters on the supply chain members’decision-making and expected profits.The research showed that both manufacturers and emis⁃sion reduction service suppliers have optimal decisions under the two emission reduction modes.Under the customization and ordering mode,the output,emission reduction per unit product and profit of manufacturers and emission reduction service suppliers decreased with the increase of initial carbon emissions and manufactur⁃ers'emission reduction coefficient.In addition to the price of emission reduction services,output,emission reduction per unit of product and profit change opposite to the emission reduction coefficient of emission reduc⁃tion service suppliers.Under certain conditions,the optimal decision,expected profit and actual profit of supply chain enterprises under the two modes generally decreased with the increase of overconfidence level.When the distribution function of market demand is uniformly distributed,the ordering mode is more beneficial to the emis⁃sion reduction service supplier,and the customization mode is more beneficial to the manufacturer.