自愿性环境规制对资源型企业高管薪酬的影响研究

Impact of Voluntary Environmental Regulations on Executive Compensationof Resource-based Enterprises in China

随着自愿性环境规制日趋普遍,其会如何影响企业高管薪酬成为一个重要研究课题。通过构建自愿性环境规制与企业高管薪酬理论模型,选取2011—2020年中国资源型上市企业作为研究样本,对自愿性环境规制与企业高管薪酬的关系进行了实证检验,同时考察了代理成本和经理人市场对自愿性环境规制与高管薪酬关系的权变影响。研究发现:(1)实施自愿性环境规制能够正向影响资源型企业高管薪酬,对于非国有、大规模和年轻企业,实施自愿性环境规制所带来的高管薪酬激励作用更显著;(2)代理成本对自愿性环境规制与高管薪酬的关系起负向调节作用,但经理人市场起正向调节作用。将自愿性环境规制纳入高管薪酬的研究范畴是对高管薪酬领域研究的丰富和拓展,为降低代理成本,推动经理人市场发展提供了经验证据。

With the increasing popularity of voluntary environmental regulation,how it will affect executive compensation in enterprises has become an important research topic.A theoretical model of voluntary environmental regulations and executive compensation was constructed,it selected Chinese resource-based listed enterprises from 2011 to 2020 as research samples,and empirically examined the relationship between voluntary environmental regulations and executive compensation.It also investigated the moderating effects of agency costs and the managerial labor market on the relationship between voluntary environmental regulations and executive compensation.The study findings are as follows:(1)The implementation of voluntary environmental regulations has a positive impact on executive compensation in resource-based enterprises,and the incentive effect of voluntary environmental regulations on executive compensation is more significant for nonstate-owned,large-scale,and young enterprises.(2)Agency costs have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between voluntary environmental regulations and executive compensation,while the managerial labor market has a positive moderating effect.By incorporating voluntary environmental regulations into the study of executive compensation,this article enriches and expands the research in the field of executive compensation and provides empirical evidence for reducing agency costs and promoting the development of the managerial labor market.