“直播+”背景下考虑平台监管的电商供应链演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of e-commerce supply chain considering platform supervision under the background of“Live streaming+”

针对“直播+”背景下电商供应链中存在的信息谎报、虚假宣传和不易监管等问题,本文首先基于演化博弈理论,构建以品牌商、MCN(multi-channel network)和电商平台为主体的三方演化博弈模型,并对各主体博弈行为及演化稳定策略进行分析.其次,根据退货率的低、中、高三种情形,运用数值仿真探究影响该动态系统演化趋势及演化稳定策略的关键因素.研究发现:直播电商供应链是否规范化运营受到多因素的影响.在低退货率下,无论电商平台是否强监管,品牌商和MCN都趋向于违规运营;在中、高退货率下,较高的潜在声誉损失、较低的虚假宣传因子以及较低的热搜效应可促使系统演化到理想的稳定状态.最后,本文结合现实运营情况对直播电商供应链规范化运营提出可行性建议.

To address the issues of information misrepresentation,false propaganda,and supervision difficulty in the e-commerce supply chain consisting of brands,MCNs,and e-commerce platforms under the background of“Live streaming+”,this paper first establishes a three-party game model based on evolutionary game theory,and then analyzes each player’s game behavior and evolutionary stability strategy.Second,numerical simulation is used to investigate the influences of some key factors on the evolutionary trend of the dynamic system and its evolutionary stability strategy in terms of lower,medium,and higher return rate.It has been discovered that the standardized operation of the live streaming e-commerce supply chain is influenced by multiple factors.Under the lower return rate,no matter whether the e-commerce platforms supervise actively or not,brands and MCNs tend to operate in violation;under the medium and higher return rate,higher latent reputation loss,lower false propaganda factor,and lower trending channel effect would promote this system to evolve to the desired stable state.Finally,this paper puts forward constructive suggestions for the live streaming e-commerce supply chain to achieve standardized operations according to the practical operations.