摘要
随着“血汗工厂”“环境污染”“儿童奴工”等事件频频爆出,当今企业需要从单一追求短期经济效益转向履行社会责任,从而实现企业高质量可持续发展.聚焦如何协调品牌商和供应商共同参与履行供应链上游社会责任,考虑了消费者的亲社会属性和参考效应,采用微分博弈方法构建了品牌商和供应商分散化决策、集中决策和单边成本分担契约三种模式的决策模型,设计了双边成本分担和收益共享契约,实现了供应链的完美协调.研究发现:1)亲社会性消费者比例的增加会倒逼品牌商和供应商提高社会责任履行努力,但消费者过度依赖品牌商誉判定品牌商供应链上游的社会责任履行水平会降低供应链成员履行社会责任的积极性.2)单边成本分担契约激励供应商提高了社会责任履行努力,且未影响品牌商的社会责任履行努力.契约刺激了品牌商誉和消费者参考价格的提升,促使品牌商和供应商利润的增加.而且,当消费者参考品牌商供应链上游社会责任履行水平效应对参考价格形成影响较大时,该契约下的参考价格反而高于集中决策模式.然而,该契约难以推动品牌商和供应商共同提高社会责任履行努力,无法实现供应链总利润的最大化.3)当品牌商的收益分享比例处于中等水平时,可以促使品牌商和供应商都参与双边成本分担和收益共享契约,并实现供应链的完美协调.
In light of recent events such as“sweatshops”,“environmental pollution”,and“child slave labor”,it has become imperative for enterprises to shift their focus from solely pursuing short-term economic gains to fulfilling social responsibilities in order to achieve sustainable and high-quality development.Focusing on how to coordinate the participation of brand firms and suppliers in fulfilling the social responsibilities of the upstream supply chain and taking account of the prosociality and reference effects of consumers,we use differential game method to build the decision-making model of decentralized decision-making,centralized decision-making,and unilateral cost-sharing contract between brand firms and suppliers.Furthermore,we design the bilateral cost-and revenue-sharing contract to achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain.The results suggest that:1)An increase in the proportion of prosocial consumers will prompt brand firms and suppliers to improve their efforts of fulfilling social responsibility.However,excessive reliance on brand reputation to determine the level of social responsibility performance of the upstream supply chain may reduce the willingness of supply chain members to fulfill their social responsibilities.2)The unilateral cost-sharing contract encourages suppliers to improve the efforts of fulfilling social responsibility,but do not affect the brand firm’s efforts of fulfilling social responsibility.The contract stimulates the improvement of brand goodwill and consumer reference prices,thus promote the increase of profits for brand firms and suppliers.Moreover,when the reference effect for the level of social responsibility fulfillment of the upstream supply chain has a significant impact on the formation of consumers’reference price,the reference price under this contract will instead be higher than the centralized decision-making model.However,the contract is difficult to promote brand firms and suppliers to jointly improve social responsibility performance,and cannot maximize the total profit of the supply chain.3)When the revenue sharing ratio of brand firms is at a moderate level,it can promote both brand firms and suppliers to participate in a bilateral cost-and revenue-sharing contract,and coordinate the supply chain perfectly.
作者
赖红珍
周艳菊
陈晓红
胡春华
LAI Hongzhen;ZHOU Yanju;CHEN Xiaohong;HU Chunhua(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China;School of Frontier Crossover Studies,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,China;Research Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Computing,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第9期2502-2516,共15页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(71991463,71991460)。
关键词
社会责任
亲社会性
参考效应
供应链协调
微分博弈
social responsibility
prosociality
reference effect
supply chain coordination
differential games