非对称信息视角下光伏产消者并网激励机制设计

Mechanism design of grid-connected incentivization for photovoltaic prosumer under asymmetric information

光伏产消者并网规模增加强化了其成本信息私有属性,在非对称信息视角下完善产消者并网激励机制设计将有效推进电力市场公开透明与光伏平价上网进程,然而鲜有文献对此展开研究.本文基于委托代理理论构建了Stackelberg微分博弈模型,讨论光伏消纳与并网激励问题下成本审核和收益监管的规制策略.结果表明:非对称信息市场环境使得产消者获得非负的信息租金,成本审核和收益监管机制均能降低其影响程度,激励光伏产消者并网消纳;随着光伏平准化水平的降低,监管者最优策略由成本审核向收益监管转变,且监管强度的增加具有正向激励作用;光伏发电平准成本的降低缓解了补贴退坡对产消者并网的消极影响,推动光伏技术革新是一项长期任务.

Grid-connected PV prosumers further reinforce the private nature of cost information.Taking asymmetric information into consideration when designing grid-connected incentives will effectively promote a fair and transparent power market and the process of PV parity.There are,however,few studies on this subject.Based on principal-agent theory,a Stackelberg differential game model is developed.We discuss the regulatory strategies of the cost audit and revenue supervision pertaining to PV consumption and grid-connected incentives.The results show that prosumers obtain non-negative information rent due to the asymmetric information market environment.Both the cost audit mechanism and the revenue supervision mechanism can reduce its influence,encourage the consumption of PV generation.The optimal strategy of regulators changes from cost audit to income supervision as photovoltaic leveling levels decrease,and the increasing supervision intensity has a positive incentive effect.Reducing PV levelling costs mitigates the detrimental effect of subsidy declines on prosumers’grid-connections.Promoting innovation in PV technology is a long-term goal.