央企集团控股股东董事会改革与企业超额现金持有

Reform of the Board of Controlling Shareholders of Central SOE Groups and Excess Cash Holdings of Enterprises

以央企集团建立规范董事会政策为准自然实验,构建多时点DID模型,考察了控股股东董事会改革对企业现金持有决策的影响。研究发现,央企集团建设规范董事会能够显著降低控股上市公司的超额现金持有水平;现金股利和R&D投资的增加是其中的作用机制。异质性分析显示,央企集团规范董事会对上市公司超额现金持有的抑制作用会受到规范董事会特征、董事个体异质性、央企集团所有者缺位程度、上市公司功能分类与金字塔层级,以及央企集团对上市公司管控力度的影响。央企董事会改革能够改善国有企业财务结构,促进国有企业高质量发展。

Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the establishment of standardized board in central enterprise groups,this paper constructs stagger DID model to examine the impact of controlling shareholders' board on corporate cash holding decisions.The research finds that:The construction of standardized board of central enterprise groups can significantly reduce the level of excess cash holdings of holding listed companies;The increase of cash dividends and RD investment are the mechanism;The heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibition of the standardized board of the central enterprise group on the excess cash holdings of listed companies will be affected by the characteristics of the standardized board,the heterogeneity of individual directors,the degree of vacancy of the owners of the central enterprise group,the functional classification and pyramid level of listed companies,and the control of the central enterprise group on listed companies.The reform of the board of central SOEs can improve the financial structure of SOEs and promote the high-quality development of SOEs.