多层次养老保障体系、延迟退休与养老金可持续性

Multi-level Pension Security System, Delayed Retirement and Pension Sustainability

劳动力供给的持续下降和传统人口红利的逐渐消失,给基本养老保险带来了更大的运行压力。在中国,基本养老保险和企业年金两种养老制度具有完全不同的给付方式,二者对员工退休意愿的差异化作用及对养老金可持续性的影响将直接关系中国养老保障体系未来的发展方向。文章基于世代交叠模型(OLG)理论框架,分析了在不同的养老金给付方式下员工的退休决策,并利用中国劳动力动态调查数据进行实证检验。结果发现:总体上,参加基本养老保险使员工产生了显著的提前退休意愿,参加企业年金使员工产生了显著的延迟退休意愿,但同时参加两项养老保险的员工退休意愿不显著。受企业年金异质性作用的主导,参加两类养老保险项目对不同特征员工退休意愿的影响存在较大差异,其中对女性、无职称、无资格认证和非高等学历人员,企业年金的延迟退休效应更为明显。机制分析表明,企业员工退休时间越晚,个人基本养老保险财富金额会越少,同时继续工作还会损害健康,耗费更高的医疗成本,致使参加基本养老保险的员工会产生提前退休意愿;企业年金财富随退休时间的延长而逐渐积累,当延迟退休所带来的企业年金财富收益引致养老金总体财富增加时,员工就会产生延迟退休意愿。因此,政府通过优化企业年金减少延迟退休阻力的方案在经济上是可行的。文章的结论为中国通过构建多层次养老保障体系推动延迟退休制度、提升养老金可持续性提供了政策启示。

The continuous decline in China's labor supply and the gradual disappearance of the traditional demographic dividend have put greater operational pressure on the basic pension insurance aimed at improving the level of protection and maintaining financial balance. As early as 2008, China's relevant authorities had proposed to delay the legal retirement age to alleviate the growing shortage of pension funds. In China,the basic pension insurance and enterprise annuity system have completely different payment methods, and their differentiating effects on employees' retirement intention and their further impact on pension sustainability will be directly related to the future development direction of China's pension security system.Based on the theoretical framework of OLG model, this paper specifically analyzes the retirement decisions of employees under different pension payment methods, and uses the data of China Labor-force Dynamic Survey to conduct empirical tests. It is found that, on the whole, participation in basic pension insurance makes employees have a significant early retirement intention(about 0.356–0.449 years), while participation in enterprise annuity makes employees have a significant delayed retirement intention(about 0.434–0.579years), thus there is no significant difference between participation in two pension insurances and participation in no pension insurance. Specifically, dominated by the heterogeneous effect of enterprise annuity, participation in two pension insurances has a large difference in the impacts of employees with different characteristics on their retirement intention. Among them, the delayed retirement effect of enterprise annuity is obvious for female employees, and employees without professional titles, qualifications, or higher education. The mechanism analysis shows that, the later the employee retires, the smaller the amount of personal basic pension insurance wealth, and longer working hours will further damage health and incur higher medical costs, resulting in employees participating in basic pension insurance having a willingness to retire early. Enterprise annuity wealth gradually accumulates with the extension of retirement time. When the enterprise annuity wealth brought by delayed retirement leads to an increase in the overall wealth of pension, employees will have a willingness to delay retirement. Therefore, the government's plan to reduce the resistance to delayed retirement by optimizing enterprise annuity is economically feasible.This paper deepens the labor supply theory of pension insurance to a certain extent. It helps to improve the personalized needs of pension plans and enhance the support and implementation of the delayed retirement policy, so as to make a smooth transition of the delayed retirement policy. It also provides policy enlightenment for China to promote the delayed retirement system and improve pension sustainability by building a multi-level pension security system.