“死活”临时极性特征背后的信息博弈策略

The Information-game Strategy as the Cause of the Ad Hoc Polarity Sensitivity of“Sihuo”

本文解答为何“死活”会在不同语境中呈现出临时极性特征这一问题。“死活”的临时极性特征背后潜藏着讲话人的信息博弈策略,即寻求劳酬均衡的策略。讲话人借助“死活”的扩域功能改变事件发生的先验概率,肯定先验概率极小的事件或否定先验概率极大的事件,从而传递强调的信息。本文首先基于语料库概括“死活”的极性分布语境,而后用泊松分布公式计算“死活”增大事件概率的效用,用自信息的公式刻画“死活”增强信息度的功能,用博弈支付矩阵分析“死活”的语用合适性。

This paper explains why sihuo(dead and alive)is an ad hoc polarity sensitive item in variant contexts.The speaker's information-game strategy underlies the ad hoc polarity sensitivity of sihuo,namely,the strategy of seeking the balance of expenditure and income.The speaker strengthens the statements by changing the prior probability of the events via the domain extension function of sihuo,i.e.,affirming the lest likely events or denying the most likely events.We characterize the distribution of sihuo on the basis of the corpora,and then calculate its utility function for increasing the prior probability of events with Poisson distribution formula,depicting its function for enhancing information with self-information formula,and analyzing its pragmatic felicity with game payoff matrix.