不同权力结构下考虑制造商在线推介的双渠道供应链均衡

Equilibrium of dual-channel supply chain considering manufacturer online referral under different power structures

运用Stackelberg和Bertrand博弈理论构建了3种不同权力结构下存在制造商在线推介的双渠道供应链优化模型,研究了不同情形下的双渠道供应链均衡。通过比较分析,探讨了制造商与实体零售商能否就在线推介方式的选择达成一致的问题,分析了在线推介方式对产品定价、渠道市场总需求以及制造商或实体零售商作为供应链主导者时的先动优势的影响。结果表明:3种权力结构下,制造商与实体零售商具有一致的在线推介方式选择偏好;在线推介方式不会改变产品的网络零售价格,但会改变产品的批发价格和实体零售价格;制造商同时推介实体零售渠道和网络直销渠道会降低网络直销渠道市场总需求,但会提高实体零售渠道市场总需求;在线推介方式不会影响制造商或实体零售商作为供应链主导者时的先动优势。

Based on Stackelberg and Bertrand game theory,the optimization models of dual-channel supply chain with manufacturer online referral under three power structures are established,and the dual-channel supply chain equilibrium in different situations is studied.Through comparative analysis of the dual-channel supply chain equilibrium,the issue of whether the manufacturer and the physical retailer can reach an agreement on the selection of online referral method is discussed.The effect of the online referral method on product pricing,total market demand of the channel,and the first-mover advantage of the manufacturer or the physical retailer act as the supply chain leader are analyzed.The results show that the manufacturer and the physical retailer have the same preference for online referral method.Online referral method will not change the online retail price of the product,but it will change the wholesale price and the physical retail price.In addition,when the manufacturer promotes both the online direct channel and the physical retail channel,the total market demand of the online direct channel will be reduced,the total market demand of the physical retail channel will be increased.The online referral method will not affect the first-mover advantage when manufacturer or physical retailer act as supply chain leader.