风险投资能够抑制管理者短视主义吗?——来自年报文本分析的证据

Can Venture Capital Inhibit Managerial Myopia?

随着我国资本市场的不断发展,股票市场呈现出越来越多的风险投资(以下简称“VC”)持有上市公司股票的现象,VC在改善公司治理的作用受到了各界的关注。本文以2009—2021年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,基于年报文本分析视角研究VC对管理者短视主义的影响。研究发现,VC能够显著抑制管理者短视主义,这一抑制作用在管理层持股比例高、债务期限结构短的公司更大。通过机制检验发现,VC通过缓解融资约束、降低代理成本和提高公司竞争力进而抑制管理者短视主义。通过经济后果检验发现,VC抑制管理者短视主义有利于扩大公司的研发投入和创新产出,表现为“长期价值增值”效应。基于研究结论,公司应完善高级管理人员的聘用和考核机制,提高内部治理水平;政府及有关部门应完善促进VC发展的政策机制。

As the capital market of China continues to develop,more and more venture capital(VC)hold stocks of listed companies,and the role of VC in improving corporate governance has attracted attention from all walks of life.Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2021 as samples,this paper investigates the impact of VC on managerial myopia based on annual report text analysis.It is found that VC can significantly inhibit managerial myopia and this inhibitory effect is greater in companies with higher management shareholding ratios and short debt maturity structures.Mechanism tests show that VC inhibits managerial myopia by alleviating financing constraints,reducing agency costs,and improving company competitiveness.Economic consequence tests show that VC inhibition of managerial myopia is beneficial for expanding company's R&D investment and innovation output,which is reflected in the"long-term value appreciation"effect.Based on the research conclusion,the company should improve employment and assessment mechanism of senior managers and improve the level of internal governance;the government and relevant departments should improve the policy mechanism to promote the development of VC.