摘要
《敦煌秘笈》中的“不知题佛经义记”中频出的“体义”一词构成“体用”概念的重要过渡概念。而这一概念之所以被“体用”概念所取代,与“体一义异”的命题不如“体用相即”命题更适合表达概念之间的辩证关系有关。“体相用”概念的直接来源虽然是6世纪前半叶问世的《宝性论》和《金刚仙论》,但自5世纪末开始,佛教文献中出现的“体-功-德”“体-用-义”等三字一组的范畴显示出,中国思想界已经力图超出“体用”二元思维的限制,创立一种三元思维的概念框架来更深刻地界定客体的内在属性和动态机制。“体相用”概念可以说是中国传统思想和印度佛教这种外来思想交涉互动的产物。
In the Anonymous Exegesis to the Buddhist Sutras(Bu-zhi-ti Fo-jing Yi-ji)in the Dunhuang Miji(Dunhuang Secrets or Secret Dunhuang Documents),the"essence-feature"(ti-yi)paradigm was frequently used.But later,it was supplanted by a similar"essence-function"(ti-yong)paradigm.The reason why the essence-feature paradigm was replaced might be that"non-duality of‘essence'and‘function'"(ti-yong xiang-ji)offered,in contrast with"the same in essence,different in meaning"(ti-yi yi-yi),a better interpretation to the dialectical relation between ideas.The"essence attribute-function"(ti-xiang-yong)paradigm originated in the Ratnagotravibhaga and Jin-gang-xian Lun(The Abhidharma of Vajrarsi),both of which appeared in the first half of the sixth century.However,ever since the end of the fifth century,the use of threefold paradigms,such as"essence-contribution-virtue"(ti-gong-de)and"essence-function-feature"(ti-yong-yi),could be already found.This indicates that the Chinese intellectual community has been seeking,from that time,to move beyond the dualistic paradigm of essence-function,and in this way to construct a trialist conceptual paradigm that could reveal more thoroughly intrinsic nature and mechanism of objects.Therefore,the essence attribute-function paradigm can be taken as a brainchild from the interaction between the indigenous and foreign intellectual traditions for China,namely,traditional Chinese Philosophy and Indian Buddhism.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第10期48-55,128,F0003,共10页
Philosophical Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大课题“南北朝《涅槃经》注释书的综合研究”(编号19JJD730005)的阶段性成果。