代理购电机制下电网企业与发电企业竞价演化博弈行为决策分析

Evolutionary game behavior and decision-making between power generation companies and power grid companies under the agent purchasing mechanism in bidding process

根据电网企业在电力市场中扮演的角色,在供给侧企业间两方博弈的基础上,将电网企业引入竞价,构建异质性企业与电网代理购电模式下供大于求的三方演化博弈模型。由于购、售双方信息不对称,为保证自身收益最大化而风险最小化,双方通过补偿机制来抵御风险。研究市场出清价格(MCP)和按报价结算(PAB)竞价机制下的电力市场竞价博弈行为,研究结果表明:在MCP机制下,三方博弈系统存在2个不受补偿影响的竞价演化稳定策略(ESS),改变补偿系数只会影响系统收敛至不同ESS的路径;PAB机制下,调整补偿系数会出现不同的ESS,且在一定条件下PAB机制下的购电成本低于MCP机制。

Based on the roles of power grid enterprises playing in the power market and the game between two power supply enterprises,a three-party evolutionary game model for heterogeneous enterprises and power grid in power purchasing mode is established under which the supply exceeds the demand.Since the information asymmetry of the sellers and purchasers,both sides follow compensation mechanisms to minimize their own risks and maximized their benefits.The game behaviors of the bidding in the electricity market are analyzed under two bidding mechanisms:market clearing price(MCP)and pay-as-bid(PAB).The research findings are as follows:Under MCP mechanism,the three-party game system takes two evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs)for bidding immune to compensation.Changing the compensation coefficient only affects the path of convergences to different ESSs.Under PAB mechanism,adjusting the compensation coefficient leads to different ESSs,the price of electricity under the PAB mechanism is lower than that under the MCP mechanism under certain conditions.