共同大股东与投资组合高管薪酬激励——兼论公司薪酬契约的“横向持股共谋理论”

Common Major Shareholders and Portfolio Executive Compensation Incentive:On the“Theory of Horizontal Shareholding Collusion”of Corporate Compensation Contract

股东目标是高管薪酬契约的基础。随着以投资组合价值最大化为目标的共同大股东日益增多,现有以单个企业价值最大化为目标的薪酬契约理论已难以全面解释资本市场中高管薪酬倒挂现象。本文提出高管薪酬契约的“横向持股共谋理论”,即与以往基于单个公司价值最大化目标不同,共同大股东会基于其投资组合整体价值最大化目标与公司高管签订薪酬契约,以此产生两者的“共谋效应”。本文利用共同大股东投资组合上市公司数据对该理论进行了检验,研究发现,共同大股东的存在不会提升高管薪酬对其所在的单个企业业绩的敏感性,但提升了对共同大股东持股联结形成的投资组合整体业绩的敏感性,初步证实了“横向持股共谋理论”适用于中国资本市场,并发现负外部性机制和大股东权力制衡机制是共同大股东“共谋效应”的影响机理,委派董事是共同大股东“共谋效应”的作用路径。进一步检验表明,共同大股东与高管之间的“共谋效应”在市场势力较强的上市公司和投资者保护程度较低的地区较为明显,且共同大股东显著提升了持股企业高管薪酬。本文不仅拓展了薪酬契约理论和共同大股东研究,也为投资者保护制度和公司治理结构的完善提出了切实可行的建议。

Shareholder goals are the basis of the executive compensation contracts.As more and more common major shareholders aim to maximize the portfolio value,it is difficult to fully explain the phenomenon of executive compensation inversion in the capital market with the existing theory of compensation contract based on the goal of maximizing the value of a single firm.This paper proposes the“Theory of Horizontal Shareholding Collusion”of the executive compensation contract:different from the previous goal of maximizing the value of individual firms,the common major shareholders sign the compensation contract with executives with the aim of maximizing the overall portfolio value,resulting in a collusion effect between the two.At the same time,the study validates the theory by using the data of listed companies with common major shareholders.It is found that the existence of the common major shareholders reduces the sensitivity of executive compensation and the performance of companies in which executives work,and enhances the sensitivity of the overall performance of the portfolio formed with common major shareholders.This initially confirms that the Theory of Horizontal Shareholding Collusion applies China's capital market.The study also shows that the collusion effect of common major shareholders is achieved through the mechanisms of negative externality and the power balance of the major shareholders.In addition,the appointment of directors is the path.Further tests show that the collusion effect between common major shareholders and executives is more obvious in listed companies with higher market power and in areas with poor investor protection.What's more,the common major shareholders significantly increase the compensation of executives in portfolio firms.This paper not only expands the existing compensation contract theory from the perspective of common major shareholders,but also complements the theories of optimal compensation contract and managerial power.It also enriches the existing research on common major shareholders from the perspective of executive compensation incentives for portfolio companies.In addition,this paper puts forward practical policy suggestions from three aspects:securities regulation,company legal system and audit standards,including information disclosure,exclusion of voting rights,review of salary-performance sensitivity,and audit of common major shareholders.Future research can focus on negative externalities,such as the price war and resource war among enterprises in the same industry,and use the data of non-listed companies to improve and verify the Theory of Horizontal Shareholding Collusion,so as to enrich the research on the theories of common major shareholders and executive compensation contract.