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外包、自研还是交叉授权?——OEM互补性技术策略选择

Technology outsourcing,independent development,or cross-licensing?-Selection of OEM complementary technology strategies
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摘要 考虑处于市场竞争的两个OEM的互补性技术策略选择问题,每个OEM只掌握一种互补性技术,且二者研发能力存在异质性,而产品的生产需两种互补性技术的结合.针对各自缺乏的技术,构建OEM的外包、自研和交叉授权3种技术策略选择模型,通过比较3种情形下的均衡结果,识别出OEM的最优技术策略选择.研究表明:具有技术优势的OEM进行技术外包时,始终存在创新抑制,然而如果它拥有极强的研发能力,外包比自研更有利;当强势方的授权程度较低并且弱势方授权程度适中时,两个OEM偏好独立研发,将放弃交叉授权;相比技术外包,技术领先的OEM对交叉授权的态度更积极,反之亦然;OEM的技术策略偏好取决于技术研发能力差异和交叉授权效应,仅有自研或交叉授权可能成为OEM的共同最优策略. This paper considers the choice of the complementary technology strategy between two OEMs competing in the market.Both OEMs master one of the complementary technologies,and the R&D capabilities of the two are heterogeneous.However,the production of their products requires the combination of two complementary technologies.For the specific technology that they lack,this paper constructs three technology strategy choice models of OEMs(i.e.,outsourcing,independent development,and cross-licensing).The optimal strategy choice scheme of the OEMs is identified by comparing the equilibrium results in the three situations.This research shows:When the OEM with a technological advantage chooses technology outsourcing,innovation is always inhibited;however,if it has a strong R&D capability,outsourcing is more advantageous than independent development.Only when the licensing level of the more capable party is low and the licensing level of the less capable party is moderate,the two OEMs prefer independent development and will give up cross-licensing.Compared with technology outsourcing,the technology-leading OEM has a more positive attitude towards cross-licensing and vice versa.OEM’s technology strategy preference depends on technological innovation capability difference and cross-licensing effect,and only independent development or crosslicensing can be the optimal strategy for both OEMs,while technology outsourcing cannot.
作者 何浩嘉 艾兴政 唐华 郭松波 HE Hao-jia;AI Xing-zheng;TANG Hua;GUO Song-bo(School of Economics and Management,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)
出处 《控制与决策》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2023年第11期3251-3260,共10页 Control and Decision
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(72072022) 国家社科基金重大项目(20&ZD084)。
关键词 技术策略 互补性技术 外包 交叉授权 STACKELBERG博弈 纳什均衡 technology strategy complementary technology outsourcing cross-licensing Stackelberg game Nash equilibrium
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