碳限额与交易机制和消费者低碳偏好下的供应链减排及融资策略

Carbon emission reduction and financing strategy for a supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation and consumer’s low-carbon preference

在碳限额与交易机制和消费者对低碳产品存在偏好的背景下,考虑由一个资金约束的制造商与一个资金充裕的零售商构成的供应链,针对银行贷款(BF)、提前支付折扣(APD)和提前支付回购(APB)3种融资方式,构建制造商主导的以企业利润最大化为目标的博弈模型,研究不同融资方式下低碳供应链的减排与定价决策,以及制造商的融资方式选择问题.研究表明:1)在3种融资方式下,减排投资成本系数的增加会降低制造商的最优单位产品碳减排量.2)提前支付下制造商的最优单位产品碳减排量始终高于BF方式.当碳交易价格较高或减排投资成本系数较高时,APB方式下制造商的碳减排量最高;否则,APD方式下制造商的碳减排量最高.3)与BF方式相比,提前支付更能提升制造商的利润,且制造商在APB方式下获利最多.

Under the background of carbon cap-and-trade mechanism and consumer’s preference for low-carbon products,we study a supply chain composed of a manufacturer with capital constraints and a retailer,and construct a stackelberg game model dominated by the manufacturer with the goal of maximizing enterprise profits.Considering three financing modes,i.e.,bank financing(BF),advance payment discount(APD)and advance payment buy-back(APB),this paper investigates the emission reduction and pricing decisions of a low-carbon supply chain under different financing modes,as well as the manufacturer’s financing mode selection.The research shows that:1)No matter which financing mode the manufacturer chooses,with the increase of emission reduction investment cost coefficient,the optimal per-unit carbon emission reduction decreases.2)The optimal carbon emission reduction level under the advance payment mode is always higher than the BF mode.When the carbon trading price is relatively high,or the emission reduction investment cost coefficient is relatively high,the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction level is the highest under the APB mode;Otherwise,the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction level is the highest under the APD mode.3)Compared with the BF mode,advance payment can improve the profit of the manufacturer,and the profit is the highest under the APB mode.