数据驱动创新下的隐私监管

PRIVACY REGULATION UNDER DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION

合理平衡数据驱动创新与消费者隐私保护之间的矛盾,是数字经济时代有效释放数字红利的关键。本文构建理论框架分析当消费者关注个人隐私、企业从事数据驱动创新时的均衡结果和两种隐私监管的福利后果。研究发现,相对于社会最优,企业选择的数据量和数据处理能力过低,而将数据选择权赋予消费者会进一步降低数据量和数据处理能力,从而降低消费者剩余和社会福利;由政府管控数据量能够有效激励企业提高数据处理能力,增加消费者剩余和社会福利。本文结论为政府科学监管企业的数据收集行为提供了理论基础和政策依据。

To effectively release the digital dividend in digital economy, it is important to reasonably balance the contradiction between data-driven innovation and privacy infringement. This paper proposes a framework to analyze the equilibrium results when firms engage in data-driven innovation and consumers are concerned about privacy, and further analyzes the welfare effects of two types of privacy regulation. The result shows that neither the level of data nor data processing capacity that firms choose is adequate from a welfare perspective. If consumers choose the level of data, they will choose even less data, thereby reducing firms' data processing capacity and lowering consumer surplus and social welfare. However, if the government regulates the level of data, it can effectively encourage firms to improve data processing capacity, thereby increasing consumer surplus and social welfare. Such findings provide theoretical guidance and policy basis for the government to scientifically regulate firms' data collecting behavior.