证券监管、公益性捐赠与审计费用——基于中国A股市场数据的实证分析

Securities Supervision,Public Welfare Donation and Audit Fees--An Empirical Analysis Based on China’s A-share Market Data

基于中国2014—2020年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证分析了证券监管、公益性捐赠与审计费用三者的关系,结果表明:公益性捐赠与审计费用正相关;证券监管对公益性捐赠增加审计费用具有抑制作用;无论是战略性捐赠还是非战略性捐赠,证券监管对公益性捐赠与审计费用的正相关关系具有显著的抑制作用;在市场化水平分组中,市场化程度低的地区公益性捐赠对审计费用的影响更加显著;相较于内部控制质量水平低的企业,内部控制水平高的企业公益性捐赠越多,审计费用越高;“审计意见购买”假说在文中不成立,验证了主检验的稳健性。

Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to 2020,this paper empirically analyzes the relationship among securities supervision,public welfare donation and audit fees.Results show that:Public welfare donation is positively correlated with audit fees.Securities supervision has a restraining effect on the increase of audit fees of public welfare donations.Regardless of strategic endowmentor non-strategic endowment,securities supervision has a significant restraining effect on the positive correlation between public welfare donation and audit fees.In the group of marketization level,the impact of public welfare donations on audit fees is more obvious in the areas with low degree of marketization.Compared to companies with low levels of internal control quality,companies with high levels of internal control donate more for public welfare and incur higher audit fees.