多个大股东与高管超额薪酬

Multiple Large Shareholders and Executive Excess Compensation

以2007—2021年间中国A股上市公司为样本,深入考察多个大股东对高管超额薪酬的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:与单一大股东的公司相比,多个大股东公司的高管超额薪酬水平更高;其他大股东数量越多、持股比例越高,高管超额薪酬水平越高;较高的审计质量和较多的机构投资者持股均能有效抑制多个大股东与高管超额薪酬之间的正向关系。机制检验表明,多个大股东的监督效率下降,使管理层权力得以扩张,进而提高了高管超额薪酬水平。

Taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as a sample,this paper investigates the impact of multiple large shareholders on executive excess compensation and its mechanism.It finds that the level of executive excess compensation in companies with multiple large shareholders is higher compared with companies with a single large shareholder.The greater the number and the higher the shareholding ratio of other large shareholders,the higher the level of executive excess compensation.Results also show higher audit quality and more institutional investors’shareholding can effectively inhibit the positive relationship above.The mechanism test shows that the supervision efficiency of multiple large shareholders decreases,which expands the power of the management and then improves the level of executive excess compensation.