义务论VS权利论——沃伦德与施特劳斯的思想交锋

Obligation-based Theory vs Right-based Theory:Confrontation of Ideas Between Warrender and Strauss

从古典自然法的先于人类意志的客观法则或道德秩序到现代自然法的源于人类意志的主观诉求或权利,构成了从义务论到权利论转向的古今之争。施特劳斯在古今之争的视域中衡量霍布斯的法权哲学,认定其为现代自然权利论的奠基人。沃伦德借助霍菲尔德的分析法学,勘定了霍布斯自然权利概念的特权属性,而既然霍菲尔德的特权与义务相反、与无权利相关,那么从自然权利中必定无法引申出义务,所以沃氏认为施特劳斯的论断需要修正。然而,沃伦德太过重视霍菲尔德法概念体系的静态分立而忽视了从特权向请求权的动态转化,因此霍布斯学者卡兰在这方面对他的反批判是成立的。与此同时,令沃伦德的研究更具理论意义的是,凭借其归属于霍布斯的自然法传统,沃氏把霍菲尔德的那种平面化的、两方当事人之间的法权关系改造为一种立体化的、三方当事人之间的法权构造,这构成20世纪法哲学的一项可能的创新。

There is a transition from the objective laws or moral orders that precede human will in classical natural law to the subjective demands or rights emanating from human will in modern natural law,and it represents a historical debate on the shift from an obligation-based theory to a right-based theory.Strauss,within the context of this transition across time,assesses Thomas Hobbes's philosophy of law and recognizes him as the founder of modern natural rights theory.Using Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's analysis of jurisprudence,Howard Warrender assesses the privilege nature of Hobbes's concept of natural rights and concludes that,since Hohfeld's privilege is the opposite of obligation and related to no-right,obligations cannot be derived from natural rights.Therefore,Warrender argues that Strauss's assertion requires correction.However,Warrender places excessive emphasis on Hohfeld's static separation of the concept of privilege within his theoretical system,overlooking the dynamic transformation from privilege to claim rights.In this regard,Hobbesian scholar Carlan's criticism of Warrender is valid.Meanwhile,Warrender's research holds theoretical significance in that he,under the premise of being a part of Hobbes's natural law tradition,transforms Hohfeld's flat,two-party legal rights relationships into a three-party legal rights structure,which could represent a potential innovation in 20th-century legal philosophy.