内外冲突关联的实力维度与冲突对象选择

State Capacity in the Internal-External Conflict Nexus and Conflict Targe Selection

作为国际安全中的重要议题,国家间的实力对比如何影响战争的爆发引发了学界的广泛关注。具体就转移视线战争而言,国家会选择对何种实力水平的对手挑起冲突来转移内部风险仍存在分歧:如若对弱国挑起冲突,并不能起到凝聚国内民众的作用;若挑战强国,又会面临冲突失败或冲突升级的风险。这种选择困境导致理论的碎片化和实证结果的冲突,因此需要纳入更加细致的情境框定系统以理解内外冲突关联中国家实力对比所发挥的作用。通过将冲突对象选择过程置于不同国内危机烈度的情境下,作者构建了一个在实力维度上的冲突对象选择理论,发现国内危机烈度不仅重塑决策者对于不同实力对手的偏好,也限制了其策略选择的能力。国内危机烈度越高,决策者越不会轻易对实力弱小的对手挑起冲突,反而倾向于挑衅实力强于自己的对手。这既详细区分了国家绝对实力和相对实力在冲突决策过程中的不同影响,又进一步突显了特殊情境对策略选择正当性的重塑。运用统计方法对1920—2000年跨国数据进行分析,结果支持了这一假说。

How the relative power among states influences the outbreak of war has become one of the core issues in the field.When it comes to diversionary warfare,there is disagreement on how states choose adversaries based on their power levels.If a state goes to war with a weak country,it may not generate the“rally-around-the-flag”effect,whereas challenging a strong country entails the risk of conflict failure and escalation.This dilemma has led to theoretical fragmentation and conflicting empirical results in the field.In light of this,the article attempts to contextualize target selection within different levels of domestic unrest intensity and proposes a theory of target selection based on domestic unrest intensity.The intensity of domestic unrest not only reshapes decision-makers's preferences for adversaries at differing power levels,but also limits their ability to choose strategies.Specifically,the higher the intensity of domestic unrest,the more likely decision-makers tend to prefer engaging in wars with opponents stronger than themselves.Statistical analyses of the international militarized dispute initiations under domestic strife from 1920 to 2000 show strong support for these arguments.