控股股东掏空、投融资决策与风险承担

Controlling Shareholder Tunneling,Investment and Financing Decisions,and Risk Assumption

上市公司控股股东的资金占用、违规关联担保等掏空行为屡禁不止,是资本市场持续存在的风险因素。基于中国上市公司2003—2020年数据,采用面板双向固定效应模型考察控股股东掏空对企业风险承担的影响。研究发现,控股股东掏空行为显著提升企业风险承担水平。机制分析表明,从融资决策来看,掏空行为导致企业杠杆率与过度负债程度上升、营运资本下降;从投资决策来看,掏空行为会挤出实业资本支出。异质性分析发现,与掏空较少的企业相比,掏空行为严重的企业其风险承担水平的上升伴随着其绩效的下降。鉴于此,应强化对掏空的监查,提高掏空行为的处罚力度,开发数字化监管手段监测与预警掏空风险。

The persistent practices of asset appropriation,irregular related-party guarantees,and other forms of tunneling by controlling shareholders of listed companies pose ongoing risks in the capital market.This study explored the impact of controlling shareholder tunnelling on corpo⁃rate risk assumption by utilizing panel data from 2003 to 2020 for Chinese listed companies and employing a panel two-way fixed-effects model.The study revealed that tunneling practices by controlling shareholders significantly elevate firms’risk assumption levels.Mechanism analysis showed that,from a financing standpoint,tunneling increases firms’leverage ratios and their de⁃gree of excessive indebtedness while crowding out working capital.From an investment stand⁃point,tunneling displaces capital expenditures in real industries.Heterogeneity analysis indicates that firms with more severe tunneling practices experience a corresponding increase in risk as⁃sumption levels,coupled with a decline in performance,compared with firms with less tunneling.Given these findings,enhanced scrutiny of tunneling practices is warranted,along with more se⁃vere penalties for such behavior and the development of digital regulatory mechanisms for monito⁃ring and issuing early warnings about tunneling risks.