董监高责任保险与企业“漂绿”行为:抑制还是加剧?

Directors' and Supervisors' Liability Insurance and Corporate"Greenwashing":Curbing or Exacerbating?

“漂绿”现象的泛滥已成为生态文明建设和社会可持续发展道路上的阻碍。为探索治理企业“漂绿”行为的有效方案,本文以2008—2021年沪深A股上市公司的相关数据为研究样本,实证探究董监高责任保险对企业“漂绿”行为的影响及作用机制。研究发现,董监高责任保险能够显著抑制企业的“漂绿”行为。机制分析表明,提升内部控制质量和缓解融资约束是董监高责任保险抑制“漂绿”行为的内在渠道。同时,本文还发现董监高责任保险对“漂绿”的治理效应在国有企业和非重污染行业企业中表现得更为明显。进一步分析结果显示,从外部监督机制来看,政府监管和媒体监督与董监高责任保险的“漂绿”治理功能之间存在一定替代效应,而投资者关注对董监高责任保险的“漂绿”治理更多发挥了互补作用;从管理层团队特征来看,在董监高团队女性比例较多、平均年龄较小以及拥有较多海外背景的情况下更有助于强化董监高责任保险对“漂绿”行为的抑制效果。本文的研究结论为董监高责任保险的发展和“漂绿”行为的监管提供了有意义的参考。

The proliferation of"greenwash"has become an obstacle on the road to ecological civilization and sus‐tainable social development.In order to explore the effective solutions for the management of corporate"greenwashing"behavior,this paper takes the relevant data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2021 as the research samples,and empirically explores the impact and mechanism of directors'and supervisors'liability in‐surance on corporate"greenwashing"behavior.The study finds that directors'and supervisors'liability insurance can sig‐nificantly curb corporate"greenwashing"behavior.Mechanistic analysis suggests that improving the quality of internal control and alleviating financing constraints are intrinsic channels through which directors'and supervisors'liability in‐surance can curb"greenwashing"behavior.At the same time,this paper also finds that the governance effect of direc‐tors'and supervisors'liability insurance on"greenwashing"is more obvious in state-owned enterprises and enterprises in non-polluting industries.Further analysis shows that,from the perspective of external monitoring mechanisms,there is a certain substitution effect between government regulation and media monitoring and the"greenwashing"governance function of directors'and supervisors'liability insurance,while investor concern plays more of a complementary role in the"greenwashing"governance of directors'and supervisors'liability insurance;in terms of the characteristics of the management team,a higher proportion of women in the board of directors and supervisors,a younger average age,and a higher number of overseas backgrounds can help to strengthen the inhibiting effect of directors'and supervisors'li‐ability insurance on the behavior of"greenwashing".The findings of this paper provide a meaningful reference for the development of directors'and supervisors'liability insurance and the regulation of"greenwashing"behavior.