流动人口基本医疗保险关系转移接续不顺畅的囚犯困境及其破解机制

The Prisoner s Dilemma on the Unsmooth Transfer and Connection of Basic Medical Insurance for Floating Population and Its Resolution Mechanism

流动人口基本医疗保险关系转移接续不顺畅主要表现在流动人口基本医疗保险关系转移接续的比例偏低、类型复杂多样、实际效果不好、面临着低统筹层次带来的挑战,削弱了对流动人口生存和发展的保障、制约了劳动力的自由流动、迟滞以人为核心的城镇化进程并且加大管理成本。不同地方政府之间有限次囚犯困境博弈是流动人口基本医疗保险关系转移接续不顺畅的重要原因之一。通过构建触发策略,把具有唯一纯策略纳什均衡的不同地方政府之间有限次博弈转化成无限次重复博弈有助于破解流动人口基本医疗保险关系转移接续不顺畅的难题,从而使不同地方政府在流动人口基本医疗保险关系转移接续方面实现合作共赢。

The unsmooth transfer and connection of the basic medical insurance(TCBMI)for floating population is mainly reflected in the low proportion of the actual TCBMI,the complicated and diverse types,the bad effect,and the challenges brought by the low pooling level in the TCBMI.This weakens the protection for floating population s subsistence and development,restricts the free flow of labor,slows down the human-centered urbanization process and increase the management costs.The finite prisoner s dilemma game between different local governments provides an explanative perspective for the unsmooth TCBMI of floating population.By developing a trigger strategy,the mechanism design that transforms finite prisoner s dilemma game between different local governments with unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium into infinite prisoner s dilemma repeated game is helpful to solve the unsmooth TCBMI,and let different local governments realize a cooperative perfect Nash equilibrium in the sub-game of TCBMI for floating population further.