存款保险制度、股东风险偏好与市场约束缺位——基于银行内部风险分配与转移的视角

Deposit Insurance System,Shareholders’Risk Preference and the Absence of Market Constraints——From the Perspective of Bank Internal Risk Allocation and Transfer

存款保险制度的设立无形中削弱了存款人的约束激励,造成银行市场约束的缺位。在此情况下,谁来对银行的市场约束补位?本文通过2011—2019年185家商业银行数据构建存款人、非存款债权人与股东三者风险之间的联立方程组,实证检验存款保险制度实施后银行内部风险的变化。研究发现:(1)存款保险制度实施后股东风险偏好增大;存款人市场约束缺位,其风险增大;非存款债权人对此进行市场约束的补位,其风险降低。股东风险由存款人与非存款债权人分担转变为主要由存款人分担,这种趋势在中小银行尤为显著,且在银行整体风险的反馈机制下同样如此。(2)银行微观利益主体从资产份额、收益回报、整体风险三个方面调整其风险承担,存款人具有收益回报动机,股东具有资产份额动机,而非存款债权人具备上述全部动机。(3)强化外部监管会影响银行的市场约束,表现为缓解存款人约束缺位,挤出非存款债权人市场约束。据此,存款保险制度的设计需注意配合监管政策目标,引导银行微观利益主体维持银行审慎经营。

The establishment of the deposit insurance system has imperceptibly weakened the incentive for depositors’self-discipline,resulting in the absence of market discipline for banks.In this case,what can constrain banks in place of the market?This paper empirically examines the changes in banks’internal risk after the implementation of the deposit insurance system by constructing a system of association equations in relation to the risks among depositors,non-deposit creditors and shareholders using data of 185 commercial banks from 2011 to 2019.The findings are as follows.(1)Shareholders’risk appetite increases after the implementation of the deposit insurance system;depositors are exposed to higher risks when market constraints on them are absent;non-deposit creditors are exposed to lower risk when they play the role of market constraints instead.Shareholder risks are no longer shared mutually by depositors and non-deposit creditors,but predominantly by depositors.This trend is particularly pronounced for small and medium-sized banks and remains the same under the feedback mechanism for overall bank risks.(2)Given that depositors have a motive for earning,shareholders have a motive for asset share and non-deposit creditors have a motive for earning,asset share and overall risk,the 3 subjects at the micro-level of bank adjust their risk-taking through their respective motive.(3)Strengthening external regulation affects market constraints on banks in such a manner as to alleviate the outcome of missing depositor constraints and crowd out market constraints on non-deposit creditors.Therefore,a key to designing the deposit insurance system is to keep in line with the regulatory policy objectives and guide beneficiaries at the micro-level of bank to follow prudent banking practice.