个人破产制度的政策效应评估——基于企业融资结构的视角

Policy Effects of Personal Bankruptcy Law——From the Perspective of Corporate Financing Structure

本文基于个人破产制度尚未在中国完全建立的背景,将不可违约的民间借贷与可违约的银行借贷同时纳入企业融资决策,并通过构造DSGE模型,对个人破产制度的宏观经济效应进行了定性与定量分析。在本文的理论模型中,企业家在决定公司债务结构时,需要在银行借贷的违约成本与民间借贷的无限责任之间进行权衡。个人破产制度的建立,虽然增加了民间借贷的违约成本,但同时也减轻了无限责任对企业家的负担。反事实分析显示,建立个人破产制度的积极效应占据主导地位,其有助于扩大经济总量,增加直接融资规模,降低银行业风险,并提升社会福利。同时,个人破产制度对于破解中国中小企业直接融资难题、缓解民间借贷乱象具有重要意义。政策方面,应当加快落实个人破产制度,同时也要配套落实更完善的监管体系。本文模型为进一步研究中国个人破产制度的设计与落地问题提供了一个便于拓展的分析框架。

Motivated by the absence of personal bankruptcy law in China,this paper incorporates non-defaultable personal debt and defaultable bank debt into the capital structure choice of a firm.By constructing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model,we investigate the macroeconomic implications of personal bankruptcy.In the model,when deciding over debt structure,entrepreneurs must consider a tradeoff between default losses associated with bank debt and unlimited liability associated with personal debt.Personal bankruptcy attaches default losses to personal debt but at the same time alleviates the burden entrepreneurs bear because of the unlimited liability.Our counterfactual analyses show that the positive side dominates.Personal bankruptcy is helpful in expanding economic activities,reducing banking sector instability,alleviating business cycles,and improving welfare.To elucidate the intrinsic logic behind personal bankruptcy,corporate defaults,and asset structures,we incorporate the endogenous choice between informal personal lending and formal bank lending by entrepreneurs into a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium(DSGE)model within the current institutional setting of China.Additionally,we qualitatively discuss and quantitatively analyze the macroeconomic effects of the personal bankruptcy system.Specifically,we begin by employing a two-period static model that simultaneously considers informal and formal lending.This theoretical framework allows us to delve into the trade-offs faced by entrepreneurs when selecting different debt structures and understand the dual nature of the personal bankruptcy system.Subsequently,we integrate equity financing to create a comprehensive capital structure within the DSGE model.The results from stochastic simulations reveal that entrepreneurs dynamically adjust their asset structures to address productivity shocks within the system.Furthermore,in our counterfactual analysis,we introduce provisions of the personal bankruptcy system,and the quantitative findings underscore the predominant positive impact of this institutional reform.It is shown to be conducive to expanding the scale of macroeconomic activities and direct financing,reducing corporate leverage and bank loan default rates,and ultimately enhancing societal welfare.This paper contributes significantly in several ways:Firstly,it incorporates the trade-off between bank and informal lending into corporate financing decisions,aligning more closely with real-world economic dynamics.It holds substantial policy implications for the advancement of personal bankruptcy legislation in China and guides market participants to rationally assess the economic impacts of such a system.Secondly,within the unique backdrop of China where personal bankruptcy is not allowed in informal lending,this paper pioneers the construction of a DSGE model to comprehensively analyze and quantitatively solve the macroeconomic effects of the personal bankruptcy system from perspectives such as economic growth,social financing structure,and societal welfare.Thirdly,on the policy front,our findings suggest that implementing a personal bankruptcy system can effectively alleviate the challenges of direct financing for small and medium-sized enterprises in China and should be pursued expeditiously.Additionally,complementary measures,including enhanced regulatory frameworks,should be implemented to mitigate potential risks like“pseudo-bankruptcies”and increased non-performing assets.The paper is structured as follows:In the first section,we introduce the background of personal bankruptcy law,explain the theoretical trade off of this policy and conduct literature review.In the second section,we construct two static models based on the trade-off between bank and informal lending and theoretically analyze the logical relationship between corporate debt structure and bankruptcy mechanisms,along with the potential economic effects of personal bankruptcy systems.In the third section,we build,solve,and simulate a DSGE model that incorporates endogenous choices between bank and informal lending,quantitatively analyzing entrepreneurs trade-offs in response to productivity shocks.In the fourth section,we introduce the personal bankruptcy system in a counterfactual model and conduct numerical analyses,examining the impact and mechanisms of different degrees of personal bankruptcy systems on the macroeconomy.Finally,in the fifth section,we summarize the entire paper and present policy recommendations.