双寡头厂商激励合同信息披露决策

Information Disclosure Decision of Duopoly Firms on Their Incentive Contracts

所有权和控制权分离的现代企业与管理者签订管理授权合同以激励管理者,但是厂商是否应当披露激励合同信息却鲜有研究。构建双寡头厂商管理授权合同信息披露博奔模型,分析厂商的合同信息披露激励及其福利效应。结果表明:在数量竞争和价格竞争下,披露合同信息都是双寡头厂商的内生化选择。与不披露合同信息相比,如果厂商进行数量竞争,则披露合同信息提高了产出、消费者剩余和社会福利,降低了厂商利润;如果厂商进行价格竞争,则披露合同信息提高了价格和厂商利润,降低了消费者剩余。因此,政府相关部门是否应当强制性要求厂商披露管理授权合同信息需要考虑寡头竞争的性质。

Modern firms with separate ownership and control rights sign managerial delegation contracts with managers to motivate them,but there is little research on whether manufacturers should disclose incentive contract information.A game model of information disclosure in duopoly managerial delegation contract is established to analyze the incentive of information disclosure and its welfare effects.The results show that in quantity competition or price competition,the disclosure of contract information is the endogenous choice of duopoly firms.Compared with the results of nondisclosure,in quantity competition,disclosure of contract information increases the output,consumer surplus and social welfare,and reduces the profits of the manufacturers,while,in price competition,disclosure of contract information increases prices and profits,and reduces consumer surplus.Therefore,the nature of the competition between oligopolies needs to be taken into account whether the relevant government departments should make mandatory requirement for firms to disclose managerial incentive contract information.