控股股东股权质押抑制了企业绩效吗?——基于市场竞争与股权结构调节效应的分析

Does the Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Pledge Inhibit Firm Performance?:Analysis Based on the Adjustment Effect of Market Competition and Ownership Structure

以2010—2020年中国沪深A股上市企业为研究样本,基于市场竞争和股权结构的双重视角,实证检验控股股东股权质押与企业绩效间关系及其内在调节机制。研究发现,控股股东进行股权质押显著抑制了企业绩效,且控股股东股权质押规模越大,企业绩效表现越差。进一步考察产品市场竞争和股权结构的调节效应后发现,产品市场竞争会加大控股股东股权质押对企业绩效的抑制作用;股权集中度会削弱控股股东股权质押对绩效的负向影响;股权制衡度则强化了两者间的负相关关系;相对于国有企业,非国有企业中控股股东股权质押对绩效的负面影响更加明显。

By selecting China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as research samples,based on the dual perspective of market competition and shareholding structure,empirically examines the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and firm performance and its internal adjustment mechanism.The findings reveal that the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge has significantly inhibited the firm performance,and the larger the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge,the worse the firm performance.After further examining the moderating effect of market competition and ownership structure,the results show that product market competition would strengthen the inhibitory effect of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on firm performance.The degree of equity concentration will weaken the negative impact of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on firm performance.The equity balance degree will strengthen the negative correlation between the two.Compared with state-owned companies,the negative impact of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on firm performance is more obvious in non-state-owned companies.